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The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are currently experiencing 
the most profound and prolonged crisis of the last fifty years. The prompt 
reaction of a number of them to the difficult situation of 1981-1982 raised 
hopes that an economic recovery would be forthcoming. Unfortunately, the 
developments of recent years have shown that such expectations were 
groundless; it is now generally recognized that major changes and a serious 
and sustained elfort will be required to put the region back on the path of 
development. The bitter medicine of recessionary adjustment did not cure the 
patient since the expected recovery of the world economy did not materialize. 
New solutions must therefore be tried as a number of countries in the region 
have been doing. 
The studies undertaken of the crisis have revealed its great complexity: 
in addition to the economic, social and political problems inherited from 
previous decades and made worse by the crisis, there are the devastating 
effects of the contraction of external trade and financing, the challenges of 
the technological revolution underway in the industrialized countries, and the 
growing popular demands for greater well-being spurred on by the processes of 
democratization. 
This situation requires considerable effort to understand the way in 
which the crisis is felt in different national situations and the best way for 
each country to overcome it. This document does not claim to provide 
conclusive arguments. It seeks, rather, to outline same ideas about social 
development, as a contribution to the debate on the future of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
It is divided into two sections. The first presents in broad outline the 
changes that took place during the postwar period up to the end of the 1970s, 
the economic and social progress made during those years, and some of the 
reasons why that progress proved insufficient. From a social point of view, 
these reasons are associated with the continued inequality of income 
distribution and with the extent of absolute poverty and underemployment. In 
turn, the causes of these situations are sought in the structure and 
functioning of the economies and the societies of the region so as to 
highlight the fact that these are only the most visible manifestation of other 
more deep-rooted, problems and that their definitive solution will require 
strategies to combat the latter. i 
The second section outlines some aspects of the strategies which could 
usefully be applied. From the economic point of view, it reviews the approach 
to recessionary adjustment, points to its limitations and the need to 
implement expansionary adjustment measures with a view to reconciling the 
demands of macroeconomic equilibrium, particularly in the external sector, 
with the need for growth. These expansionary adjustment measures should, in 
turn, be combined with' two other basic elements: modernization of the 
technical and productive , infrastructure, a prerequisite for any sustained 
development, and, measures aimed at better co-ordination of the productive 
infrastructure and at improving the employment, production, productivity and 
income levels of the disadvantaged groups in the society, lhe latter element 
is of crucial importance for economic growth and for the equitable 
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distribution of its benefits. Thus, it provides the économie underpinning of 
the social dimension of the strategy, which in turn has a twofold objective, 
It must first support efforts towards technological modernization, in which 
education has a decisive role to play; in order to be genuine, this 
modernization raust be based on a profound socio-cultural transformation which 
would favour the development of creativity and would highlight the need to 
respond innovatively to changes in technology and production methods. 
Secondly, it should directly improve the living standards of the disadvantaged 
social groups, particularly of those which, have been most affected by the 
crisis because they lacked the resources to defend themselves. Of particular 
importance in this regard are nutrition, health and education policies aimed 
at ensuring that poverty is not carried over to new generations, and measures 
aimed at satisfying the basic needs of the disadvantaged and at integrating 
them into the mainstream of society. 
The final part of the document malees reference to some of the 
socio-political aspects of the strategy. Strategies usually focus on an 
examination of the technical aspects of policy measures and do not pay the 
necessary attention to the social agents and to the political and 
institutional mechanisms which, in the final analysis, are crucial to their 
success. 
In this regard, three principal ideas must be highlighted. Firstly, in 
view of the considerable effort required for the implementation of the 
strategy, the majority support of the population is necessary; consequently, 
the content of the strategy and the manner of its implementation must 
stimulate and consolidate this support. Secondly, the State raust play a 
decisive role in the elaboration and implementation of the strategy and should 
therefore become the social nucleus that most faithfully reflects the 
organized action of the society. Thirdly, the role of the State in the 
development strategy should not be conceived in a technocratic or 
authoritarian manner, as an imposition on the society of the dictates of 
enlightened minorities, but rather as the expression of a democratic 
institutionality. 
These three ideas refer to aspects of reality which are not to be found 
in existing societies and, to a large extent, must be created. An organized 
society which lends support to the strategy, a well-articulated and efficient 
State which acts as its principal executing agent, and prevailing democratic 
institutions, are requirements whose importance cannot be underestimated. A 
number of crucial questions may be asked concerning these ideas, To what 
extent have the often endemic conflicts generated by the type of development 
and the tremendous gaps between social groups, with their sequels of mistrust 
and resentment, diminished the possibility of organized action by the society? 
To what extent has the social fabric been destroyed, the behaviour of social 
groups perverted, as reflected in the sectoral and speculative attitudes of 
some groups, and the effectiveness and legitimacy of the State undermined? 
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I. THE SITUATION IN THE PERIOD 1950-1980 AND THE 
IMPACT OF THE CRISIS 
A, PRINCIPAL CHANGES IN THE PERIOD 1950-1980 
1. Economic changes 1/ 
The extent of the macroeconomic and sectoral changes is clear evidence of the 
profound changes which occurred in the countries of the region during this 
period. 
Total output increased fivefold in thirty years and output per capita 
more than doubled (see figure 1). Investment levels were very high in some 
countries and this brought with it significant changes in productivity and 
technology; the industrial plant in the region underwent significant expansion 
and diversification, enabling local production to meet almost all the demand 
for consumer goods and an increasing proportion of the demand for basic 
intermediate and capital goods, and to promote, particularly after the 1970s, 
an increasing diversification of exports with the inclusion of manufactured 
goods. At the same time, through improved marlœting systems and the 
development of agroindustry, agriculture was transformed with the introduction 
of modern production methods and improvements in its organization and in the 
marketing of goods. Infrastructure was also considerably expanded, 
particularly in the transport, communications and energy sectors. 
The output of manufactured goods increased sevenfold, with its share of 
total
 t output increasing from 17% in the 1950-1952 period to 24% in the |1979-1980 period. This increase meant that steel production, which is a 
reflection of industrial activity, increased from 1 = 4 to 29 million tons. 
Moreover, a number of countries managed to achieve scales and efficiencies of 
production, which enabled them to compete in international markets. Together 
with the production of cement, which increased tenfold during the period in 
question, steel production provided the basis for an expansion in physical 
infrastructure and the foundations of a metalmechanics industry. The car 
manufacturing industry, whose production had been insignificant in 1950, 
produced more than 2 million units in 1980. The production of machinery and 
equipment increased to substantial levels in some countries and was able to 
satisfy a substantial portion of requirements which had been previously 
imported. Also, beginning in the 1970s, there was a considerable expansion in 
the branches of the chemical industry, although with notable differences among 
countries. 
In 1980 the production of electric energy was fourteen tines the 1950 
level and per capita consumption was 30% more than the average on the European 
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continent in 1950 and twice that of Japan for that same year. Mention should 
also foe made of the increase in oil production which several countries of the 
region achieved in a few years, the execution of major engineering worlts and 
the development of large areas of land for agricultural production. 
No less spectacular was the change at the institutional level. In 1950, 
the hacienda in most countries was one of the symbols of the system, and the 
family business and artisanry were the norme in industry; planning and 
development agencies had just been incorporated into the public sector, the 
banking system remained underdeveloped and, generally speaking, the same was 
true of the financial markets. Thirty years later, the region had modern 
enterprises, particularly public ones, which handled both plants and business 
turnovers on a scale comparable with that of the major companies in the 
developed countries. The traditional foreign company that exploited natural 
resources had been replaced to a large extent by the transnational corporation 
and in many cases by State-owned companies, in the agricultural and livestock 
sector, modern enterprises had emerged which took full advantage of the 
technical and infrastructural services created by the government and 
established links with external markets and with the most dynamic sectors of 
the internal markets. The 1970s also witnessed the development of a financial 
market which was closely linked to the transnational financial system and 
which ended up playing a key role in the functioning of economies. 
Finally, it should be noted that during this period the role of 
governments expanded considerably. In the economic field policies relating to 
industrialization, agriculture, road systems and energy, were elaborated? 
macroeconomic policies were pursued which mobilized considerable volumes of 
internal and external resources; reforms were introduced in the tax, agrarian 
and tariff systems; public enterprises were established and expanded without 
which it would have been difficult if not impossible to achieve changes in the 
system of production. The actions of private national producers were supported 
and complemented by the public sector. And so, in thirty years, institutional 
changes acquired a coherent qualitative dimension with material changes 
reflected in the fivefold increase in the gross domestic product. 
2. Social changes 
In addition to the economic changes mentioned above, the occupational 
structures of the countries in the region underwent far-reaching changes 
during the decades under consideration.2/ At different times, varying speeds, 
and with varying degrees of success, almost all the countries advanced in the 
transition from agrarian societies to urban-industrial societies, following 
the general process that has been referred to as "social modernization".3/ 
By 1980, some countries had still not completed the first phase of this 
transition; in others, which had undergone modernization earlier, the cycle 
was already in its final phase of deceleration and was approaching completion. 
Rapid, though uneven, changes took place in the socio-occupational 
structures of most of the remaining Latin American societies (see table 1). 
Here, the expansion of the State apparatus, the increasing capitalization of 
economic relations, and the increasing educational opportunities available to 
3 
new generations, were associated with the absolute and relative growth of 
occupational sectors with higher levels of productivity and income in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors, at first, mainly in manual occupations and 
subsequently in non-manual areas. 
This occupational change had, inter alia, an important effect in that it 
promoted structural mobility in the society, a fundamental aspect of the 
social changes that occurred during this period. 
The process of social modernization also includes a demographic 
transition during which the high fertility and mortality rates typical of a 
poor rural society were reduced —the decrease in the mortality iate occurring 
before the decrease in fertility rates— until both reached low and relatively 
stable levels in the advanced stage of the development of urban~industrial 
societies. With the exception of those countries which had achieved 
modernization earlier on, in which these indicators had attained low levels 
several decades ago, the countries of the region have only in the 1960s and 
1970s experienced a drop in fertility rates from high and very high levels. 
Since the infant mortality rates also decreased rapidly during this period, 
the working-age population which had continued to rise steadily, reached its 
maximum historical growth rates in recent years and will maintain or increase 
those levels during the next decade or two in the newly modernizing countries 
(see table 2). 
The great challenge of social modernization is to win the race against 
population growth by creating high productivity jobs at a rate faster than 
that of the increase in the economically active population in general, and 
among the active workers in the most disadvantaged occupational strata in 
particular. In order to achieve this transition towards a modern society and 
reduce the relative burden of the disadvantaged classes, through their 
progressive incorporation into the society, it is necessary to absorb the 
youths and adults from these classes —particularly agricultural workers— 
faster than their rate of natural increase, through education and employment 
in the modern sector. In those countries where rapid transition has taken 
place recently, the economically active population attained its maximum growth 
rate in the years immediately preceding the crisis, thus placing tremendous 
pressure on the capacity to create productive employment. Growth and rapid 
occupational transition only partly succeeded in relieving this pressure, 
although the degree of success varied from country to country. For example, 
the countries newly in transition were unable to significantly improve the 
average income level of their populations and their populations of working age 
maintained or accelerated their high growth rate, which will attain its 
maximum levels over the next few years. 
Censuses clearly reveal that changes in the occupational structure 
followed a pattern of upward mobility (see table 1). The relative size of the 
low productivity sectors and occupations decreased while the more productive 
and modern sectors were also, in general terms, the most dynamic with respect 
to the creation of jobs. 
Four important aspects of this structural transformation need to be 
highlighted: a) in almost all the countries the relative size of the lowest 
stratum (manual agricultural workers and peasants) decreased; b) the number of 
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workers in areas of personal service increased slightly, tending to stabilize 
at around 12% of the economically active population; c) the great majority of 
countries recorded a relatively significant growth in the numbers of manual 
workers, but above all there was rapid growth in the strata of non-jmanual 
workers with higher average incomes. 
It should be noted that in those countrJ.es in which the economically 
active population grew at a faster rate there were also absolute increases in 
better qualified and higher income occupational groups. Moreover, increasing 
structural mobility clearly shows an inverse relationship to the stage reached 
in the transition towards social and occupational modernity, since it was 
generally stronger in those countries that were in the initial stages or in 
the midst of the transition to modernization, and less marked in those 
countries in which the cycle of transition was about to be completed and was 
slowing down. 
It is probable that in societies with rapid structural change, some 
members of a high proportion of families may have been affected by the 
phenomenon of upward mobility during the decades under consideration. Indeed, 
if the mobility of young people in 1980, .in relation to the generation of 
1960, is taken together with the structural mobility experienced by the latter 
generation throughout its life, it can be concluded that mobility has reached 
significant levels in families in those countries just beginning to modernize 
and in those in the midst of a sustained transitional phase. 
Finally, mention must be made of the key role played by education as a 
vehicle for social mobility between older and younger generations or age 
groups (see table 3). In all the countries of the region, the proportion of 
active young adults with post-primary education increased sharply in the 
decades under consideration, doubling in all cases and tripling in some. An 
important effect on the job market of the expansion of education in those 
countries in the first phase of transition was the abandonment of manual 
agricultural labour and the search for employment as semi-skilled urban 
workers. In those countries in mid-trans it ion, this effect was combined with 
the greater access to non-manual posts achieved through post-primary 
education. The increase in educational levels also continued in those 
countries in which the transition was almost completed, both in respect of 
wage-earning manual workers and self-employed persons and of non-manual 
categories; the higher qualification requirements of more modern jobs led to 
the search for more education by various social groups, which hoped thereby to 
obtain higher income levels. 
In summary, particularly in those countries with higher economic growth, 
many social groups managed to improve their situation, although the relative 
distribution of income and power was not changed; the social structure was 
being transformed both vertically and horizontally by the changes inherent in 
the transition from a rural to an urban society, which enabled these groups to 
feel that they were participants in an upward movement, or to hope at least 





B. UNEVENNESS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
The gains achieved by the economic and social processes during the postwar 
period should not obscure the failures of those processes. From the social 
point of view, with which this document is concerned, a number of problems 
stand out which could not be solved in the region even in the years of 
greatest economic growth. While these problems did not affect all countries 
equally seriously, as the following analyses show, their widespread nature 
and, above all, their intractability drew attention even in those years and 
they were referred to in various reports of ECLAC. The combination of 
successes and failures highlighted the contrasts of the process and caused a 
feeling of ambivalence among those who sought to evaluate it in an unbiased 
manner. 
The most acute social problems include the unequal distribution of 
income; the large number of people living in conditions of absolute poverty; 
and the large numbers that remained unemployed or, above all, underemployed. 
1. Unequal distribution of income 
As is known, income in the majority of countries of the region has been 
concentrated within a very small section of the population. In this respect 
there are considerable differences between countries, with the concentration 
of income being generally greater in countries with low levels of production 
per capita.4/ 
However, it has also been clearly established 5/ that, at least up to the 
middle of the 1970s, the considerable economic development achieved in the 
region was not accompanied by a reduction in the inequality of income 
distribution, but on the contrary by an increase in the concentration of 
income in terms of regional averages (see table 4). 
During the 1950s and 1960s it was hoped that, upon completion of the 
first phases of the development process, the combination of high rates of 
economic growth and major advances in education, together with changes in the 
occupational structure --from one in which low-income jobs predominated to one 
with jobs that require more training— would lead to a reversal of the 
tendency towards concentration of income, and to a sustained process of 
improvement in income distribution. Such a reversal of the trend did begin to 
be witnessed in various countries and at different times during the last 
decade, although in other countries income was further concentrated during the 
same period. For Latin America in general, however, this improvement did not 
go as far and was not as marked as had been expected: the poorest 40% of the 
population increased its share of total income by only 0.6% between 1970 and 
1975, while the share of the richest 10% was only reduced from 48.0% to 47.3%. 
In other words, the improvement that took place during the first half of 
the 1970s was so slight that income distribution did not even regain the 
already very uneven patterns of the 1960s, when the poorest 20% of households 
received barely 2.8% of total income, and the poorest 70% received less than 
28%. While all income groups increased their average inermes in the 
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fifteen-year period from 1960 to 1975, the richest benefited much more from 
the overall increase. The richest 10% of households increased their annual 
average incomes by almost US$ 4 700 to reach a total of more than US$ 15 800 
per household; the poorest 20% had a net increase of only US$ 60 per 
household, which took them up to an average of less than UK$ 400 per annum in 
1975. 
This limited redistribution was the result not only of the change in the 
occupation structure, but also of the emergence and consolidation of social 
movements which pressured governments to secure wage increases and the 
application of policies of income redistribution. However, another negative 
trend which could be observed throughout these years should not be forgotten 
either: the poorest majority of the population generally had a very low level 
of participation in the cycles of growth and bore a much greater burden during 
phases of lesser growth or of concentration of income;6/ a large number of 
people at the bottom of the social pyramid were in a very precarious position 
from which it was very easy to sink into extreme poverty if economic growth 
slowed down or income became more concentrated. Generally speaking, the slight 
fluctuations .in the •acame pyramid did not alter the latter's inequality nor 
did it lead to a stable participation in the fruits of development for the 
most disadvantaged, majority of the population. 
2. Extent and spread of poverty 
In stark contrast to the achievements and changes brought about by the process 
of development in the rcjion, in 1970 there were roughly 112 million 
chronically undernourished people, many of them illiterate, living in rural 
shanty towns or in urban slums, virtually without access to medical services 
and to other important social services, In other words, almost 40% of the 
population of Latin America lived in conditions of absolute poverty unable to 
satisfy their basic needs. The majority, 65 million people, lived in rural 
areas and accounted for 58% of the total poor and 56% of the rural population 
(see table 5).7/ 
Ten years later, it is estimated that the number of poor people increased 
to 130 million although, in relative terms, their percentage of the total 
population dropped to 37%.8/ There was a significant shift in the areas where 
the poor lived; the number of people living in urban areas increased from 47 
million in 1970 to 64 million in 1980, and the proportion of the total number 
of poor people living in urban areas increased from 42% to 49% between 1970 
and 1980.9/ In the rural areas, the absolute number of poor people increased 
by only one million during those ten years; nevertheless, in view of the low 
rate of increase of the rural population, estimated to be an average of 1% per 
annum, the proportion of the poor in rural areas continued to represent more 
than 50% of the rural population in 1980.10/ 
A campai"ison between the changes in poverty and economic performance 
between 1970 and. 1980 shows that most of the countries of the region 
maintained high .rates of economic growth; the gross domestic product per 
capita rose during those years to an average of 3.4% per annum. 11/ However, 
the percentage of poor people was reduced, by only 3% during that period and 
their absolute m Timbers increased by about .18 million, This development serves 
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to confirm that the benefits of the economic growth achieved during this 
period were not correspondingly reflected in a reduction in poverty. 
Regional averages, however, conceal considerable differences in national 
averages. If countries are grouped according to the relative scale of poverty 
in the population as a whole, three groups may be distinguished: those 
countries with less than 10% of their population below the poverty line; those 
in which this proportion varies between 16 and 26%; and finally, the remaining 
countries with the highest level of poverty, varying between 37% and 65% of 
the total population (see table 5). 
In this latter group of countries, poverty is mainly concentrated in the 
rural areas and its pattern is closely associated with the increase in the 
number of minifundios. According to EREALC estimates, in 1980 65% of the 
population involved in agriculture was engaged in the peasant economy, which 
constituted the refuge of the labour force displaced by mechanization from 
agricultural enterprises. 
Also, it must not be forgotten that the differences between urban and 
rural areas do not fully reflect the scale of the disparities in income, 
poverty and standards of living of the population in different regions of the 
same country. Many studies, particularly those referred to as "maps of 
poverty", have shown that economic growth has not led to significant 
reductions in the inequalities between regions. 
3. Persistence of underemployment 
ECLAC has always paid particular attention to problems of employment, to the 
extent that the productive absorption of the labour force is, in its view, the 
clearest manifestation of economic development. The developments in the region 
in this respect over the three decades preceding the current crisis is 
therefore a central theme in the evaluation of the development process in the 
region. While there were sharp differences between countries, this period 
witnessed the apparent paradox of a considerable increase in the capacity to 
absorb the labour force in modern non-agricultural sectors taking place at the 
same time that underemployment persisted or declined very slowly.12/ 
During the long period of development from 1950 to 1980, modern 
non-agricultural employment in the region —referred to as formal urban 
employment in the terminology of PREALC— increased at a high annual average 
rate of 4.1%, a rate which exceeded the growth rate of the economically active 
population not engaged in agriculture (4.0%) and the growth rate of the 
economically active population as a whole (2.5%). Despite this, towards the 
end of the 1970s, about two fifths of the labour force in the region was 
underemployed, either in the informal urban sector (19.4%) or in activities in 
the traditional agricultural sector (18.9%) (see table 6). 
A number of elements were involved in the slow decline in unemployment 
and underemployment or in the persistence of these trends in the region. The 
interaction of these elements explains the varied results of the absorption in 
the modern sectors of the economy and the evolution of underemployment in the 
different groups of countries. Special mention should be made of one group of 
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countries (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela) where, 
during this period, there was rapid absorption of the labour force into modern 
sectors —with higher levels of productivity and incomes—, together with a 
slow but substantial reduction in underemployment, and countries where there 
was a slower absorption into those sectors together with the persistence of 
high underemployment rates (Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru). 
Finally, the trend in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, in this respect, was 
different from that in the above two groups since these were countries that 
had advanced much earlier than the rest of the region in the process of 
transfer of manpower to modern sectors, and countries which, at the same time, 
had rates of growth of the total economically active population not engaged in 
agriculture that were significantly lower than the rest of Latin America. In 
these countries, the problem of underemployment is centered in the urban 
areas, and its growth between 1950 and 1980 took place from levels that were 
much lower than those of the other countries, attaining in 1980 a figure of 
less than 30% of the labour force. 
There are, however, general factors which explain the problem of the 
persistence of unemployment and underemployment and which, in most of the 
countries of the region, acted as a brake to a more dynamic absorption of the 
labour force into modern sectors of the economy, despite the fact that 
comparatively speaking, employment in modern non-agricultural sectors in the 
region grew at rates that were not lower than those that had been recorded in 
countries which are today developed. On the one hand, the change in the 
occupational structure took place in the region within the framework of a 
dramatic increase in the non-agricultural labour force, brought about by 
migration from rural to urban areas, by increases in the rate of participation 
in the economy and by the natural increase in the urban population itself. 
This placed tremendous pressure from the side of the supply of manpower, 
particularly in those countries which began their demographic transition at a 
later stage. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that by 1950 
approximately 70% of the urban labour force in the region was engaged in 
modern non-agricultural activities. As a result, even with growth rates 
slightly higher than the rate of increase of the economically active urban 
population, growth in employment in the modern urban sector was not as great 
in absolute terms as the increase in the total urban working population. In 
other words, despite the rapid creation of employment in modern sectors, the 
process was insufficient to absorb all of the severe pressure of the urban 
supply of labour. 
To a large extent, this relative insufficiency explains the development 
of informal activities in which the majority of the urban underemployed were 
engaged. Between 1950 and 1980, the percentage of the total labour force in 
the region engaged in informal activities increased from 13.5% to 19.4%. 
The pattern of underemployment reflects the net effect of two opposing 
trends, the first more far-reaching than the second: the relative decrease in 
underemployment in the agricultural sector and the growth in urban 
underemployment. Consequently, total underemployment in the region fell from 
46.1% to 38.3% between 1950 and 1980. In 1980, more than half of the 
underemployed were already concentrated in the informal urban sector. 
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In general terms, the trends observed in the region over the last three 
decades may foe described as follows. In transferring labour to more productive 
activities, the region does not seem to have diverged in general from the 
patterns experienced by countries which are today developed.' However, there 
are three elements which characterize the countries of the region. First, the 
greater pressure of the urban labour supply. Second, the relative inability of 
the modern, sectors to fully absorb it, which leads to the growth of informal 
employment. Third, the slow pace at which employment in traditional 
agricultural activities is being reduced. These factors explain why, after 30 
years of rapid absorption, significant underemployment still exists. 
Finally, it must be remembered that the evolution of employment has not 
been a continuous process in the region in the period under consideration. The 
three factors just mentioned have developed differently in time. Total 
population growth and the growth in the urban population in particular 
gradually accelerated and reached its peak rate towards the end of the 1960s. 
However, in a significant number of countries this peak was attained in the 
1970s, and the average annual rate exceeded 3%. With a lag of somewhat more 
than a decade, during the 1970s and 1980s, the growth rate of the labour force 
was to approach 3% per annum and in the urban areas was to exceed 4% annually. 
On various occasions, therefore, ECIAC drew attention to the challenge to 
create employment in the 1970s and 1980s. The figures for the decade of the 
1970s show that the problem of employment, and more particularly forms of 
underemployment, persisted, if it did not worsen, despite the economic growth 
recorded in some countries. 
4. Some causes of the ambivalence 
The problems posed by the economic and social processes in the countries of 
the region, briefly touched upon in the preceding pages, have given rise to 
varying interpretations that seek to identify the factors that explain them. 
These interpretations have usually had both a theoretical and a practical 
objective; indeed, a proper appreciation of these processes would make it 
possible not only to understand them better but also to develop strategies 
which would go beyond the superficial aspects and tackle the root causes of 
these problems. 
In ECIAC, the most serious interpretations have sought to elucidate the 
causes for this type of development in the region, whereby technical progress 
and its benefits tend to be concentrated in certain regions, productive 
sectors and social groups, so that more heterogeneous and inequitable 
structures are established than those in the developed countries. In the 
latter technological advances were vigorously and extensively propagated, thus 
giving rise to more homogeneous and equitable structures, while in the 
countries of the region, the most dynamic sectors, both the primary exporting 
sector and the industrial sector, did not have a sijnilar pull capacity. That 
is why these countries can have high rates of economic growth while structural 
heterogeneity persists and the social problems of unequal distribution of 
income and the persistence of high levels of poverty and underemployment 
cannot be resolved. 
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The causes of this type of concentrated development are extremely varied 
and the degree of their impact naturally varies in accordance with national 
situations and the particular moment in time. Among the causes of domestic 
origin, the importance has been emphasized of the use of capital intensive 
technologies that are ill-adapted to existing resources, and of the 
considerable increase in the labour force caused by the population growth; 
both causes have had an unfavourable impact on the productive absorption of 
the labour force and, consequently, on the dissemination of technological 
progress and the benefits that flow from it. 
Another key idea in this respect concerns the unequal distribution of 
power within the social groups, a pattern which would have far-reaching 
consequences. This inequality, which takes the form, in particular, of 
ownership of the means of production and the capacity to determine economic 
policy through control of the State apparatus, has been considered a decisive 
factor in explaining the inequitable distribution of income. 
This inequality of income distribution, in turn, determines to a large 
extent the pace and the direction of economic development since it determines 
effective demand. Indeed, those in whose favour wealth is distributed create 
an effective demand chiefly aimed at imitating the patterns of consumption of 
the developed countries, which are inappropriate in countries with a much 
lower level of income. The nature of this demand influences the taking of 
economic decisions (what to produce, by whom, how, etc.) which determine the 
productive structure and, through its effect on imports, the overall 
composition of the supply of goods and services. Moreover, the unequal 
distribution of income leads to its inefficient use, which affects the rate of 
reproductive accumulation and hence the rate of increase of average incomes 
and of the productive absorption of the labour force. 
In this interpretation, which is particularly thought-provoking from a 
sociological point of view, social inequality is not viewed as a static 
phenomenon concerned merely with the distribution of income; on the contrary, 
it is a dynamic factor which has helped to shape the economic structure and to 
determine its orientation, thus creating the conditions for its own 
reproduction. 
An examination of the historical development of the countries of the 
region in the postwar period reveals the uneasy coexistence of two opposing 
trends. On the one hand, the trend towards the concentration of wealth, rooted 
in internal economic, social and political inequalities, which seek to 
maintain this inequality through the very changes that take place. This 
pressure is exercised through a diverse range of formal and informal 
procedures and mechanisms by those social groups that occupy a predominant 
position in the unequal structure. On the other hand are the tendencies that 
promote technological progress and its benefits. Particular attention should 
be paid to the more spontaneous of these tendencies, arising from the changes 
which the impetus of economic development itself gives to demand, to the 
structure of the labour force and to its productivity and income levels. In 
addition to these spontaneous trends, which exist in varying degrees in the 
countries of the region, there are more deliberate trends which have been 
promoted, particularly within the State apparatus, by social movements and 
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groups which seek to reverse the trends towards concentration and to achieve 
thereby a more equitable distribution of the fruits of development. 
The opposition between these two trends, towards the concentration of 
wealth on the one hand and towards greater homogenization and democratization 
on the other, explain to a large extent the contrasts in the development 
picture of the region; they also lie at the root of most of the conflicts that 
have taken place in the region. 
This digression on some of the factors which explain the unevenness and 
contrasts in the development of the region has no claims to being an original 
theory. It only seeks to point out that the social problems exemplified by the 
distribution of income, poverty and underemployment are the most visible 
manifestations of deep-seated root causes, and that a permanent solution to 
those problems will only be possible if their root causes are addressed. 
C. THE CRISIS OF THE 1980s: SELECTED INDICATORS 
1. The evolution of economic indicators 
It is possible to appreciate the scale of the crisis from the evolution of 
aggregate economic indicators after 1981. From this year onwards a decline 
occurred in the sustained rate of growth which gross domestic product had 
maintained for almost four decades (see figure 2). The annual rate declined 
from 5.3% in 1980 to 0.5% in 1981, and was negative in the next two years. 
During the 1982-1983 biennium, domestic product fell in absolute terms, 
something which had never occurred in the forty previous years. 13/ As from 
1984 the domestic product of the countries of the region as a whole tended to 
recover, and grew at an average rate of 3% per year. However, these regional 
figures must be handled with caution, since they are influenced by the 
behaviour of the Brazilian economy, whose gross domestic product accounts for 
approximately one-third of the region's total product, and in the 1985-1986 
period grew at an annual rate of 8%. If Brazil is excluded, the region's 
global product in 1986 was barely 2% higher than in 1980. During the same 
period, Brazilian product increased by approximately 18% (see table 7). 
An even more striking image of the crisis is provided by the evolution of 
per capita domestic product between 1980 and 1986, a period during which the 
population of Latin America and the Caribbean increased by more than 50 
million, rising from 355 million to 406 million. During these six years per 
capita domestic product fell by around 8% and was equal to the level which the 
region had attained in 1977 (see table 8). Moreover, this unsatisfactory trend 
was extremely widespread: in three out of ; the nineteen countries, the 
indicator fell by more than 20%; in ten
 ;countries it declined by between 10 
and 20%, and only in Brazil, Colombia, Cuba and'Panama was per capita product 
higher in 1986 than in 1980. Since net payments'of profit and interest abroad 
increased sharply during this period and the terms of trade also worsened, the 
decline in per capita national income —which provides a better indicator than 
gross product of the population's average standard of living— was even 
sharper. For the region as a whole per capita national income was 14% lower in 
1986 than in 1980, and in value terms can only be compared to 1976. The crisis 
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dragged back the population's average income to levels it had reached a decade 
previously (see figure 1). 
The impact of the downturn in economic activity was particularly strong 
on capital formation. Vilhile capital formation had grown dynamically during the 
1970s at an average annual rate of 7.3%, it declined at a rate of 4.5% in the 
last six years and in 1986 was 25% lower than it had been in 1980. 
Consequently, not only has the crisis affected present standards of living, 
but it has also jeopardized the possibility of future growth and improvement 
in the population's standards of living. The seriousness of this is even more 
apparent if it is taken into account that the permanent lack of domestic 
savings to finance investment in the economies of the region is compounded by 
external restrictions resulting from the dwindling inflow of external savings 
and the need to devote an extremely high proportion of resources to 
amortization and interest payments on the huge external debt which has been 
built up. 
As could be foreseen, in view of the high rate of growth of the labour 
force in most of the countries of the region, the shrinkage in economic 
activity went hand in hand with an increase in rates of open unemployment and 
a rise in the various forms of underemployment (see table 9). All of these 
factors were aggravated by a very considerable deterioration in real 
remunerations. In addition, in spite of the increase in unemployment and the 
drop in wages, the rate of price increases rose in most of the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean during the crisis. In the region as a whole, 
the average annual rate of consumer price increases (weighted by the 
population) rose from 56.1% in 1980 to a maximum of 275.3% in 1985, and then 
fell to 69.1% in 1986 (see table 10). The intensification of inflation during 
the first five years of the 1980s was doubtless one of the discouraging 
domestic features which most contributed to the deterioration in real wages, 
whose nominal increases remained far below the increase in prices in the 
majority of countries. 
All of these discouraging trends in the evolution of domestic variables 
—particularly until 1983 when the lowest point in the recessive cycle was 
reached— were closely linked with the disappointing trends in the external 
sector "which were most apparent in the deterioration in the terms of trade, 
the striking fall in airports, the draining away of international reserves, the 
frequent and sometimes enormous rises in the exchange rates and, above all, 
the overwhelming weight of the servicing of the external debt, which forced 
most of the countries in the region to renegotiate their commitments with the 
international private banks and with their official creditors".14/ 
The region's swollen debt, the result of the rapid increase recorded in 
loans until the middle of 1982, together with high rates of interest charged 
since the beginning of the present decade, is the factor which most 
jeopardizes the future development of Latin America and the Caribbean. The 
debt rose from less than US$ 100 billion at the end of 1976 to over 330 
billion at the end of 1982 (see table 11). Private creditors represented a 
growing proportion of the debt, whose financing was marked by floating rates 
of interest and relatively short repayment periods. This brought about an 
explosive increase in debt servicing, which., nevertheless, failed to lighten 
the burden of the total disbursed external debt, which continued to grow 
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—although at a lower rate— until 1986, when it represented approximately 
US$ 382 billion. One indicator alone gives an idea of the burden which debt 
payment constitutes for the region in terms of resources: the amount of 
interest payments due thereon, which in 1978 absorbed approximately 15% of the 
foreign currency earned by Latin America and the Caribbean from its exports of 
goods and services, rose to between 35% and 40% between 1982 and 1985 (see 
table 12). Moreover, the debtor countries have been obliged to sign partial 
and repeated rescheduling agreements on the maturities, signifying that the 
debt capital continues to grow, in spite of the net negative transfer of 
resources taking place at the present time (see table 13).15/ 
2. The impact of the crisis on the labour market 
The crisis had three basic effects on the labour market, all of which had a 
negative, direct and pronounced impact on the population's standard of living, 
leading to an even greater deterioration in the living standards of the 
lowest-income sectors. First of all, the rate of job creation slumped. 
Secondly, changes took place in the type of employment created and, finally, 
wages fell.16/ Between 1980 and 1985 non-agricultural employment grew at a 
cumulative annual rate of 3.3% signifying a shrinkage of approximately 20% in 
the number of jobs created annually with respect to the trend in the past (see 
table 14). The growth was insufficient to absorb the new members of the labour 
force who enter the market each year, and led to an increase in open 
unemployment. Consequently, during the period, the number of unemployed rose 
at a cumulative annual rate of 8%, signifying an expansion of approximately 
48% in the number of unemployed between 1980 and 1985.17/ While in 1980, 
urban unemployment in the region had been 7.8%, it rose to 11.9% (simple 
average for 17 countries) in 1985 (see table 9). The rise in unemployment 
mainly occurred during the first three of these five years, and coincided with 
the downturn in economic activity. Between 1980 and 1983 the number of 
unemployed grew by more than 50%, From this year onwards, the number of 
unemployed ceased to rise but neither was there any significant decline in 
unemployment. Between 1983 and 1985 the rate of unemployment fell by only half 
a percentage point. In other words, the trend in open unemployment between 
1980 and 1986 would seem to indicate that it is more sensitive to the downward 
phase of the economic cycle than to expansion or recovery. This fact gives 
reason for concern since, in present circumstances, the mere restoration of 
the historical growth rates of economies will not alone suffice to bring 
unemployment down to its pre-crisis levels, which were already high. 
The second consequence of the crisis concerns the changes in the 
structure of employment, which reflect an increase in the proportion of jobs 
characterized by the greatest degree of underutilization of labour. Data on 
nine countries in the region 18/ reveals three trends in this direction: 
informalization, tertiarization and an increase in employment in the public 
sector. The most 'noteworthy consequence of the deterioration was felt in the 
rapid expansion of employment in the informal urban sector. This sector grew 
at a cumulative annual rate of 6.8% between 1980 and 1985, signifying a 39% 
expansion of the informal sector during the period. While in 1980 the sector 
had constituted 26% of non-agricultural employment, it rose to 30.7% of 
employment in 1985.19/ The growth rate of informal employment was 80% higher 
than that recorded during the thirty years prior to the crisis, a fact which 
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indicates the scale of the change involved. Consequently, these recent trends 
indicate a break with those of the past and a worsening of the employment 
situation mainly affecting the lowest-income sectors of the population. The 
trend has moreover, been accentuated by the behaviour of private-sector 
employment, which not only created less formal jobs during the period, but 
also tended to concentrate job creation in small-scale firms marked by lower 
levels of productivity and income than large enterprises. 
The third consequence of the crisis on the labour market was the 
widespread deterioration in wages. The evolution in all the wage indicators 
available for the 1980-1985 period indicates falls of between 12% and 18% in 
the variations between extreme years (see table 15). A number of factors 
account for this behaviour. First among these is the high and increasing rate 
of inflation which brought down real wages. Secondly, the increase in 
unemployment and of employment in low productivity sectors weaken the 
bargaining power of organized wage-earners and led to a wearing down of real 
wages. Last but not least is the fact that the shrinkage in real wages was one 
of the basic aims of the adjustment policies implemented in the majority of 
countries in the region. Moreover, it should be mentioned that the shrinkage 
in remunerations had a greater impact on workers in productive sectors 
characterized by lower average incomes. The decline was least pronounced (12%) 
in the most organized sectors of manufacturing industry, while minimum urban 
wages, as well as those in construction and agriculture fell by more than 15% 
over the same period.20/ 
In most countries the decline in real wages during the crisis surpassed 
the fall in per capita product and was greater in almost all sectors than the 
decline in gross per capita income. Together with other data, this would seem 
to suggest that the burden of readjustment was mainly borne by workers, 
particularly those with lower incomes, with a consequent deterioration in 
income distribution. 
3. Some social consequences of the economic crisis 
It has recently been pointed out 21/ that the social impact of the crisis in 
Latin America and the Caribbean has been of "kaleidoscopic diversity". The 
deep differences between countries prior to the crisis, the varying scales of 
impact of the debt, the divergent rates of dynamism or stagnation in 
production together with the various social consequences of the adjustment 
policies implemented in countries combined to bring about considerable 
divergences in the social indicators available for countries relating to the 
early years of the crisis. Many governments have made considerable efforts to 
adjust to the new circumstances, and a small number have managed to maintain 
the satisfactory evolution of levels of per capita income, income 
distribution, diminution of poverty as well as of indicators relating to 
health, education and nutrition, or to restore them, if there had been an 
interruption in the improvement. 
As far as the vast majority of countries in the region were concerned, 
however, the available data, while of broken coverage and variable quality, 
clearly indicate, as a whole, that there has been a widespread deterioration 
in the social conditions of the population and in the social services provided 
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by governments. Expenditure on a variety of social services by central 
governments fell as a percentage of their total expenditure until 1984-1985, 
in comparison with 1980 in 14 of 19 countries, and rose in only five.22/ It is 
possible to more clearly grasp the complex changes in social conditions by 
individualizing the various trends in terms of i) income distribution and 
proportion of the population living in poverty; ii) unemployment and 
underemployment; iii) health and nutrition; and iv) education. 
a) Income distribution and poverty 
Both the increase in unemployment and underemployment together with the 
fall in wages suggest, within an overall context of stagnation or decline in 
per capita product, that an inevitable consequence of the crisis will have 
been even greater inequality in income distribution and an increase in the 
proportion of the population living in poverty. Direct information on income 
distribution during the crisis is still extremely scanty and fragmentary, but 
on the basis of recent ECLAC research, 23/ it is possible to put forward a 
number of tentative approximations as to the scale and nature of these 
problems. 
As table 16 shows, the data relating to the evolution of indicators 
during the 1977-1982 period reveal a heterogeneous situation: the incidence of 
absolute poverty fell in three out of five urban contexts, and increased in 
one of the two which provided urban and rural coverage. This partly reflects 
the earlier onset of the crisis in the last two cases, together with the 
persistence of the impact of the weak cycle of déconcentration prior to the 
crisis, already referred to in the others. Between 1982 and 1985, on the other 
hand, the already generalized impact of the crisis is more apparent: the 
incidence of poverty increased in four of the five urban context and in one of 
the two with urban-rural coverage. In 1985, the proportion of urban households 
below the poverty line varied between 11 and 41% of the total in different 
countries, while in those two countries which also include the rural 
population, the proportion was between 15 and 37%. 
In urban areas, the impact of the crisis was clearly reflected in these 
indicators: in the four cases in which poverty increased, income concentration 
also rose, and coincided with falls in gross per capita domestic product in at 
least one of the years under consideration. In the case of Colombia, the 
déconcentration of urban income between 1979, 1982 and 1985 reveals, from 
another angle, that it has been one of the countries in the region least 
affected by the recession of the last five years (see table 8). 
The most recent data available indicate that the low-income agricultural 
and rural sector has also experienced a net deterioration as a result of the 
crisis, and that this has contributed to an increase in poverty at the 
national and regional level. First of all, real agricultural wages in a total 
of 16 countries fell by an average of 10% between 1980 and 1983 and by a 
further 6% between 1983 and 1985.24/ In contrast with this overall trend, it 
should be mentioned that in the two surveys which provide rural coverage there 
was no significant increase between 1983 and 1985 in the proportion of 
agricultural wage-earners living in poverty.25/ 
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In the only recent survey available covering the whole of the rural 
population (the region of Los Andes, Venezuela) the proportion of own-account 
agricultural workers living in extreme poverty no only rose from 44% in 1978 
to 58% in 1985, but this increase also cancelled out the opposite trend among 
wage-earners and brought about a net increase in the proportion of poor 
agricultural families in the total of poor families, which itself increased, 
partly as a result of the above.26/ 
A further case which illustrates a similar trend is that of Brazil, 
where, according to surveys providing general coverage,27/ there was an 
increase in the concentration of income per household during the two years 
following the fall in per capita product, 1982 and 1983. Within this 
regressive movement, not only did the gap between the average urban income and 
the considerably lower average income of rural families widen, but in addition 
the distribution of income among the latter became even more unequal. The 
decline in relative terms which affected the poorest 40% of rural families 
was, consequently, one of the determining factors in the renewed concentration 
of national income, which was moreover more marked than that of urban income 
during these two years.28/ It should be mentioned that this trend is likely to 
have improved as a result of the expansionary and redistributive policies 
implemented in Brazil during 1986. 
Moreover, the apparent discrepancy between these indicators of increased 
rural poverty and the growth in the value of agricultural product disappears 
on examination of the new preliminary data set out in table 17. These confirm 
the considerable increase in the value of the region's agricultural product in 
1983-1985, but also reveal a marked reversal of the long-standing trend 
towards a reduction in the growth of the agricultural population —and 
consequently, a downturn in the durable increase in its average productivity— 
which coincides with the crisis. It would appear that the agricultural 
population has once again started to grow, as a result of what has been 
described as a slump in the creation of employment in cities,29/ at similar or 
higher rates to the growth of agricultural product, thereby cancelling out its 
favourable impact in per capita terms, both in 1980-1983 and in 1983-1985. It 
should moreover be remembered that the category of "farmers" includes, in 
addition to the high proportion of poor peasants, entrepreneurs with capital. 
In the region of Los Andes, for example, 23% of the farmers interviewed 
belonged to the richest 40% of total rural and urban households in 1985.30/ In 
contrast with the growth of the sector of poor peasants and agricultural 
labourers, agricultural entrepreneurs seem to have been inordinately 
successful in appropriating the benefits of the increase in agricultural 
production. 
According to the 1982 and 1985 surveys, other sectors of employment 
which, together with peasants, were affected by the greatest increases in the 
proportion below the poverty line are: manual and service-sector wage-earners 
(in the three surveys which identified them); own-account workers with the 
same occupations (part of the "informal urban" sector) in two of the three 
surveys; salaried office workers and sales personnel (in three out of four 
cases) ; and own-account traders and carriers (in three out of three). In other 
words, it is possible to observe both the impact of the increase in 
"underemployment" in the informal sector as well as those of open 
unemployment, declines in wages and loss of trades-union bargaining power in 
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the formal sector, analysed in the previous section. The greater proportion of 
poor families among formal manual workers in comparison to informal workers, 
in three out of five surveys, is particularly striking, together with the fact 
that this proportion increased more among formal workers. Similarly, in the 
case of own-account traders and carriers the proportion of poor increased, but 
they represent a small part of the total in this occupational group in almost 
all the surveys. The majority of this group belongs to the upper half of 
families on the basis of per capita income in 1985.31/ These contrasts suggest 
that a considerable proportion of the increase in poverty during the crisis is 
the result of wage restraint and unemployment, and that own-account manual 
workers and txaders cannot be considered as a homogeneous whole characterized 
by underemployment, although this feature has become increasingly significant 
within this group as a consequence of the crisis. 
The same information reveals, moreover, that real income corresponding to 
the characteristic occupations of the urban middle classes (the professions, 
technicians, and administrative workers) fell during the crisis. This is 
clearly apparent from the decline in their share of the highest 40% of the 
population's income and the corresponding increase in their share of the 
middle 20% of income.32/ 
b) Health and nutrition 
According to data provided by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
and the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) ,33/ between 1980 and 1984 per 
capita expenditure on health by the central governments rose in only nine out 
of 23 countries in the region. This overall trend has also been pinpointed in 
a study made by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) which reveals that 
this type of expenditure increased in four out of 16 countries between 1979 
and 1983, and fell in twelve. 34/ According to the same source, the cutbacks in 
expenditure on education and health were sharper than those in total 
government expenditure in a considerable number of the countries examined, 
while in others it was rather more protected. In several countries, 
expenditure on health and education declined extremely sharply. 
In a number of countries, policies and programmes attending the needs of 
the most vulnerable groups (occasionally, to the detriment of slightly less 
poor ones) successfully avoided reversals, for example, in the historical 
reduction in the rates of infant mortality. In others, however, the declining 
historical trend ceased, and this key indicator remained stable during the 
crisis or even rose.35/ 
The evolution of nutrition indicators was extremely complex; the currency 
crisis severely restricted imports of food, and this shrinkage was only partly 
offset by the growth of domestic production, a consequence of which was a drop 
in the food available per person in 13 out of 17 countries in recent years 
(see table 18). In the case of the four countries which recorded slight 
improvements, one of them has still not recovered the average level of 
sufficiency attained at the beginning of the 1970s. As a whole, six countries 
do not possess sufficient supply to even meet average minimum requirements, 
while in all of those whose indexes are over 100, large proportions of the 
population do not satisfy their minimum calorie requirements. Moreover, in 
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many countries the fall in household income, together with the rises in prices 
resulting from che shrinkage in food subsidies (frequently imposed as a 
condition by international credit institutions), made it even more difficult 
to satisfy food requirements, with the exception of those of the highest 
income sectors. In Mexico, the available data indicate that the middle class 
altered its diet so as to include a greater proportion of cheap food, while 
the urban poor had to actually reduce their consumption of nutrients. In 
Brazil, the frequency of anemia among the children of poor families seems to 
have increased in 1985 in comparison with 1973-1974.36/ In Chile, the amount 
of milk distributed in school programmes fell, and in 1983 represented 74% of 
the amount distributed in 1981 37/ while the country's budget for school meals 
in general remained low between 1982 and 1985 in comparison with the peaks 
attained in previous years. 38/ In Guatemala, the per capita supply of 
nutrients progressively declined and in 1985 fell to 92.7% of its 1981 level 
in so far as calories are concerned, 91.2% in the case of proteins and 87.9% 
in the case of fats.39/ 
In a number of countries, there seems to have been an overall improvement 
in the health and food situation in recent years. However, the most 
disquieting feature of the deterioration is the worsening of the food and 
health situation of the poorest sectors, a situation which appears to persist 
as a result of the increase in inequality in access to goods and services 
meeting these basic needs. 
c) Education 
The information available on expenditure on education as a percentage of 
the central government budget and of gross product, indicates a marked per 
capita decline in real terms during the initial years of the crisis (see table 
19). In 12 out of 18 countries in the region, government per capita 
expenditure on education declined in real terms between 1980 and 1984. In four 
out of six countries in which average expenditure rose (with the exceptions of 
Panama and Venezuela), it began with very low levels (US$ 25 per head or less) 
in 1980. 
This prevailing trend is confirmed by data provided by the UNICEF study 
already mentioned, relating to the same period, which also indicates that the 
shrinkage in expenditure on education as a proportion of total public 
expenditure is more pronounced in Latin America than in other regions affected 
by the crisis.40/ 
A further phenomenon, which is just as serious as the fall in resources 
and the probable deterioration in the quality of education thereby involved, 
is the increase in the number of dropouts from primary and secondary school 
detected in several countries (Chile, Costa Rica, Brazil).41/ This phenomenon, 
which overwhelmingly affects the poorest sectors, is clearly linked to the 
impossibility for these families to meet the cost of school and the vital 
importance of the economic contribution of minors for the survival of the 
whole family. This latter feature is reflected in the increases in the rates 
of economic activity among children and young people of school age.42/ The 
increases in the number of dropouts are a source of particular concern in view 
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of educational objectives and the educational requirements involved in 
adjusting to the technological changes taking place in the world economy. 
D. THE SHORT- AND MEDIUM-TERM OUTLOOK 
The crisis of the 1980s has been to some extent the last manifestation of a 
deferred social crisis. An important aspect of the crisis is the loss of 
viability of a logical aspiration for the satisfaction of demands based 
largely on mobility of a structural origin, on expansion and diversification 
of consumption, and on economic growth to meet all the corporative pressures, 
instead of settling the conflicts, inherent in each stage of the transition 
towards modernity, between capital and labour, and between privileged strata 
and exploited or excluded groups. 
1. The capacity of the economies to absorb the 
growing labour force productively 
In 1986, in contrast to previous years, several Latin American and Caribbean 
economies showed signs of recovery. Nonetheless, in most of the countries in 
which the product appreciably increased, its rise merely represented a partial 
recovery of the levels that had been already reached before the crisis.43/ 
What is more, in more than half of the countries of the region the per capita 
product fell in 1986, in some cases for the sixth year in a row. 
The favourable performance of some of the large and medium-sized 
economies during 1986 is, then, a positive fact and shows that there is a 
capacity for recovery if external constraints are eased. It would be 
premature, however, to conclude that a dynamic and sustained recovery has 
begun, and that the crisis has been surmounted. 
On the contrary, the outlook for the economies of the region remains 
uncertain. In 1986 the foreign debt continued to grow (at a higher rate than 
in 1985) while the terms of trade continued to deteriorate (see tables 7 and 
11). The total interest paid by the region as a percentage of exports seems to 
have stabilized at around 35% in the last three years, and it is thought that 
it will not fall below that level in the coming years. Similarly, during 1986 
the region continued its negative net transfer of resources, this time in the 
amount of over US$ 22 billion (see table 13). Investment, for its part, 
continues at levels which are far below those of the period prior to the 
crisis. 
As regards external prospects, and as will be shown later on, there are 
clear indications that the fall in commodity prices and their very low present 
level reflect far-reaching structural changes in world demand. Moreover, it is 
unlikely that international interest rates will continue to fall in the 
immediate future. Finally, there is evident resistance to the reduction of 
protectionism in the central countries. 
At this stage, the objective conditions of the world economy, the 
conditions of debt payment, and the constraints imposed on the economic 
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policies of the debtor countries by international financial institutions, are 
beginning to indicate severely restricting parameters for the evolution of the 
Latin American and Caribbean economies and societies. If these coixlitions do 
not change, a development style might arise, undesired and unsought by the 
peoples and governments of the region, which would not be able to meet the 
challenge of the striking growth of populations of school and working age (see 
table 2), which calls for the creation of places for study and productive work 
(see table 20 and figure 3). The most optimistic scenarios of economic growth 
for 1987-1990 rest on assumptions that are unlikely to be all fulfilled (e.g., 
rapid growth in the central countries, reduction of protectionism, 
improvements in the terms of trade, low interest rates, a greater supply of 
credit, etc.). Even accepting these optimistic assumptions it is estimated 
that, if basic conditions remain unchanged, the per capita gross domestic 
product of the region may grow by only 3.5% per year from now to 1990.44/ 
Given that economic growth no longer seems to have the same positive effect on 
job creation as in past decades, it is estimated that productive employment 
will increase by less than 0.5% per year, while the labour force in the region 
might grow, on average, by 2.8% per year. These facts point to the clear and 
decisive conclusion that "growth alone will not suffice to surmount the 
employment problem" 45/ without radical changes in government policies in this 
field. 
In these circumstances, the unemployment and underemployment existing in 
1980 will have been intensified in 1990 by around 32 million persons more. 
With the present patterns of production and distribution, an increase is 
forecast not only in the proportion of underemployed persons and those living 
in a state of poverty, but also in the seriousness of their relative and 
absolute privations. 
Hence there can only be an improvement in the rates of production and 
productive job creation, and a further reduction in the high rates of 
accumulated underemployment and poverty, aggravated in recent years, if the 
basic conditions prevailing today can be changed. 
2. The dilemmas of social mobility 
The projections of the crisis and of its social consequences support the 
hypothesis of the existence of a crisis of the social systems in the region, 
in the sense that it is impossible to restore a social rationale of 
development identical to that which prevailed from the postwar period up to 
the end of the 1970s. The challenge that faces the region is indeed immense: 
with fewer resources than in the past it has to grapple with problems which, 
apart from having changed in magnitude, have also undergone a change in 
quality. The current processes, economic, social, demographic and cultural, 
constitute in their interaction a new dynamic of structural change, which in 
turn generates new tensions and contradictions. 
As already indicated, over several decades there was a growing implicit 
expectation, not analysed or questioned by large sectors of the population, of 
the possibility of occupational mobility for the coming generations. It is 
probable that this expectation, irrespective of conjunctural fluctuations, 
will continue to influence the hopes of families for many more years. If this 
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is so, the present conditions could be aggravating a twofold "deficit of 
mobility"; one being objective, expressed in a downward social mobility wiiich 
has already occurred and which is measurable in terms of the structural growth 
of jobs of lower quality, an increase in poverty and income concentration; the 
other, subjective, in terms of the frustrated hopes of a future mobility 
similar in its tempo to that which prevailed for two or more generations until 
the very recent past. The slowdown in the creation of new productive jobs, 
apart from its well documented adverse impact on unemployment and 
underemployment, is having negative effects on upward mobility in the sense 
that the new jobs, in proportions much greater than in the past, are inferior 
in income and in social prestige. 
In particular, there has been a pronounced reversal of the long declining 
trend in the growth of the economically active population engaged in 
agriculture in the years before the crisis, which reached annual rates equal 
or superior to those of the non-agricultural employed population in the period 
1983-1985. This, together with the poor performance of per capita output in 
the sector in these years, has profound repercussions on structural mobility. 
Although no definite conclusions can be drawn from provisional data covering 
so short a period, if this new trend persists it could signify the breakdown 
of the most important channel of upward mobility during the period before the 
crisis: the transition from agricultural employment to occupations of an urban 
type, with relatively higher average incomes and prestige. 
This proportionately faster growth of low-quality jobs in recent years 
has meant a brusque reversal of the historic transformation of the productive 
structure, in which there was a progressive increase in the proportion of jobs 
of a medium and high level. At present, on the contrary, there is a downward 
social mobility for the young generations entering the labour force today of 
around 20% in only five years in some cases,46/ in comparison with the 
generations of their fathers and elder brothers; a phenomenon unknown before 
the crisis. 
At the same time, the striking fall in medium and minimum wages in 
different sectors of activity signifies a similar retrocession in the other 
mechanism for the social legitimation of the style before the crisis, the 
expansion of consumption for growing proportions of the lower social strata. 
It will be difficult to restore this process at the rate pertaining before the 
crisis unless notable changes occur in the rates of economic growth, and in 
the rules of the game regarding distribution of the future benefits of 
development and investment allocation. 
The crisis of the social system, consisting in this double breakdown of 
the social rationale which contributed to the viability of the style in force 
before the crisis, poses a set of new socio-political problems in the region, 
in addition to the economic problems. As will be shown later on, a more 
favourable socioeconomic evolution will depend, in the first place, on the 
countries' achieving a greater international presence in the spheres in which 
decisions are adopted concerning the debt and trade (which assumes governments 
with strong popular support and concerted action at the regional level) and on 
new economic "motors" of industrialization and export. Second, it will depend 
on the discovery of more effective ways of increasing employment and labour 
productivity in the marginated sectors and on new rules of the game regarding 
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distribution. Additionally, there will be a need for the creation of new forms 
of satisfaction, material and non-material (such as participation, equity, 
nationalism, etc.) which will partly replace social mobility and the expansion 
of consumption as supports for the legitijnacy of the development models. 
Otherwise, it is foreseeable that political instability and social 
disorganization will increase in the form of anomie, delinquency, and anti-
social behaviour, particularly among young adults in countries in which these 
rapidly growing cohorts encounter serious barriers to their access to 
secondary and higher education, productive employment and upward occupational 
mobility.47/ 
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II. OUTLINES OF STRATEGY IN FACE OF THE CRISIS 
A. ECONOMIC STRATEGY: SOME DIMENSIONS 48 
1. Recessionary adjustment 
The initial response to the crisis of most of the countries of the region was 
to adopt forms of adjustment mainly aimed at reducing the deficit on the 
balance-of-payments current account, which, as mentioned above, represented 
35% of their exports in 1981-1982. The policies applied succeeded in 
drastically reducing this deficit, but at the cost of a marked fall in 
investment, economic growth and employment. 
These policies, described as "recessionary adjustment", assumed that the 
main cause of macroeconomic imbalances lay in excessive demand, which would 
create not only disequilibrium in the balance of payments but also an increase 
in inflati- . and a distortion of relative prices in favour of non-tradeable 
goods. Consequently, the basic thrust of these policies was aimed at attacking 
this excess demand by reducing the fiscal deficit, applying a restrictive 
monetary policy and exercising control over wages, together with currency 
devaluation designed in particular to restructure domestic prices in favour of 
tradeable goods. 
The enormous economic, social and political cost of these policies, which 
was stressed in earlier pages, could not be sustained for long, and in fact 
they were always conceived as transitory; a sort of bitter medicine that had 
to be taken in order to prepare the way for making better use of the recovery 
of the world economy, which, it was assumed, would take place in the short 
run. As this recovery did not occur to the extent desired —both because of 
the limited growth of the developed countries and its reduced "pulling" 
capacity— the supposed benefits of recessionary adjustment were called into 
question. The recession caused by the fall in domestic demand was much more 
radical and prolonged than had been expected; the effects of the adjustment 
were magnified by the rise in interest rates and the lack of domestic 
credit,49/ and were aggravated by the persistente of the adverse conditions of 
international trade; devaluation frequently increased inflation through 
raising the relative prices of tradeable goods; and, finally, the speed with 
which the attempt to carry out the adjustment was made did not allow the 
productive structure to adapt itself to it. Hence the adjustment turned out to 
be excessively recessionary, exaggerated, inefficient and prolonged. 
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2. Expansionary adjustment 
The criticisms levelled at the approach described above and the negative 
results of its application quickly weakened its theoretical and practical 
prestige and stimulated the search for new political options capable of 
combining the attainment of macroeconamic equilibria with growth. 50/ 
Outstanding among these options is the variously designated "expansionary 
adjustment", "adjustment with growth" or "structural adjustment", whose chief 
aim is to stimulate the production of tradeable goods, especially exportable 
goods, in order to put a permanent end to the stubborn external bottleneck. 
This approach is based on the criterion that adjustment policies, which should 
be clearly differentiated from stabilization policies, do not need to be 
recessionary. Indeed, their success does not depend on reducing demand but on 
redirecting it towards non-tradeable goods, while steering investment towards 
the production of tradeable goods. In a first phase, idle capital and labour 
should be employed in producing exportable goods; the use of this capacity 
would stimulate economic activity and give time for production to be 
reoriented in the desired direction. This would call for specific and 
selective measures that would foster (through the exchange-rate policy, 
subsidies, incentives, tariff surcharges, etc.) those activities that were 
able to respond on a larger scale and with more efficacy, speed and continuity 
to the key objectives of expansionary adjustment. 
The approval that this policy approach enjoys is based on the fact that 
its recommendations seek to provide a structural response to the problem of 
external imbalance, whose negative effects on the countries of the region have 
been exacerbated by the current crisis. It is true that its aim is to solve a 
very serious problem. Nevertheless, this is not the only problem that deserves 
attention. Hence, if it were rigidly applied it might overshadow other aspects 
of the development strategy that should not be overlooked. Concern for solving 
the external imbalance should form part of every development strategy; in each 
national situation, however, the economic, social and political objectives, 
problems and resources, along with the prospects of the world economy, will 
indicate if this should occupy a dominant place or if, on the contrary, it 
should be subordinated and adjusted to other elements of the global strategy. 
3. Technological modernization 
In this connection, recent years have witnessed an increase in concern for the 
impact on the region of the changes that are taking place in the international 
scene, which tend to globalize the economic system, centralize power, 
revolutionize technology, and establish new relations between the financial 
and productive sectors.51/ 
Particularly noteworthy among these are the technological changes that 
have stimulated both the growth of the world supply of foodstuffs and the 
increasing decline of raw materials as components of the total cost of 
industrial products. This has caused a drop in the prices and demand for 
primary products, and therefore in their terms of trade, which gradually 
depresses these activities, both at the national level (in the developed 
countries) and world-wide. This process confirms the old and controversial 
thesis of the disparity of elasticities of demand for imports of primary and 
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industrial goods as a basic cause of external imbalance, and underscores the 
need to escape from the dead-end strategies which are centred on primary 
commodity exports. 
These changes are accompanied by those that reduce the costs of the 
labour factor. In effect, the automation of production is widening the gap 
between the growth of production and that of manual labour, giving great 
importance to knowledge, information, and capital, and reducing that of 
labour. Cheap labour will increasingly lose importance as an element in the 
competitiveness of the countries of the region in world markets. 
These processes, among others, highlight the fact that the countries of 
the region should make an enormous effort to achieve technological 
modernization in order to increase their international competitiveness and 
change their form of insertion in the world economy. Indeed, any long-term 
solution to the external imbalance in particular, and to development in 
general, must be based on this modernization. 
Technological modernization is founded, in its turn, on a set of 
conditions of various types. Outstanding among the socio-cultural conditions 
is the creative capacity, directed especially towards the discovery and 
expansion of those areas of economic activity which are best fitted to meet 
the needs of development.52/ Genuine modernization is that which gives value 
to local resources, initiating processes of domestic innovation functional to 
the needs and potentialities of each country; in contrast, spurious 
modernization is expressed only through the superficial imitation of imported 
behaviour patterns which do not increase the national capacity for creation. 
The invigoration of the creative capacity thus oriented can only be achieved 
if systematic training of the population is introduced through educational 
institutions and the information media, and if permanent efforts are made to 
establish the most rewarding links between domestic and external demands and 
opportunities, on the one hand, and existing and potential national 
capacities, on the other. 
The development of local technological capacity, thus understood, has 
always been the nucleus of a genuine process of development and consequently 
should be a major item in every long-term strategy. This is the basis of the 
measures aimed at surmounting the external imbalance; thus conceived, both 
elements of the strategy are mutually compatible. Indeed, given the trends 
already indicated in the international scene, any appropriate insertion into 
international markets should be based on a techno-productive process of 
modernization that will enable the countries of the area to abandon the role 
of exporters of raw materials which they still fulfill. 
Similarly, these objectives redefine other important aspects of the 
strategy, some of which have been the subject of persistent controversy, such 
as the supposed alternatives of State and market, import substitution and 
export promotion, and others, to which some reference will be made later on. 
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4. Articulation of production and distributive equity 
Nevertheless, the combination of the approaches based on technological 
modernization and on adjustment with growth may still leave out some 
dimensions relating to the distribution of this modernization and its 
fruits.53/ 
As mentioned earlier, all the types of development that have existed in 
the countries of the region (outward-looking, inward-looking, and their 
variations) have followed a pattern of distribution which in general has been 
concentrâtive, despite the spontaneous mechanisms and deliberate efforts to 
the contrary. Historically, it might be argued that any form of development 
would seem to require the concentration of effort in specific activities or 
sectors; at all events, the measure of their success will depend on the 
"pulling" capacity of the activities which are in the van to carry the 
backward sectors with them at any given time. Success would thus be evaluated 
by the advances made in techno-productive assimilation and the distributive 
equity attained. In actual fact, the concentration of efforts in certain 
activities has generally been a direct result of policy decisions that 
concentrate resources and increase the relative prices of the goods and 
factors of the favoured sectors; in this respect, the strategies for 
technological modernization and expansionary adjustment are no exception. 
Their justification depends on their capacity to carry the rest along; 
otherwise there would be no legitimacy in the concentration that favours them, 
which is based on the effort of the whole community. At the same time, a 
concentration which does not have the hoped-for effects becomes not only an 
ethical problem but also an obstacle to development, since it does not 
stimulate the expansion of the domestic market and generates social tensions 
and political instability. 
Given that the different types of development experienced by the region 
have not been generally capable of achieving complete success in the task of 
absorbing the labour force productively and distributing income equitably; 
that the crisis has greatly aggravated these problems; and that the 
technological trends in the developed countries indicate that labour is 
gradually losing importance in the organization of production: can it be 
expected that the combination of technological modernization and expansionary 
adjustment will lead to more homogeneous and equitable structures? 
It seems unlikely that this will occur, and the process will probably 
have to be deliberately induced through policies essentially aimed at 
articulating the production structure and improving distributive equity. 
Regarding the articulation of production, suffice it to point out the 
enormous advantage that would accrue from the linking up of agriculture, 
industry and services, in order to reduce the gap between country and city, 
and between large enterprises and medium-sized or small. 
In relation to policies aimed at equity and designed to improve the 
situation of the marginated strata, emphasis is usually placed on the 
modification of the relative prices in favour of the peasant sector, the 
raising of real wages, the transfer of resources through fiscal policy, etc. 
These redistributive measures are important, especially for the short-term 
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improvement of the living conditions of those sectors that have suffered most 
from the crisis; they must be assessed with care, however, since their effects 
are ephemeral and often superficial, and do not affect the root causes of the 
concentration. Thus they should be considered rather as a complementary 
element in a set of policies aimed at diffusing technological modernization. 
To achieve this diffusion economic policy and public resources must be 
reoriented towards the creation of productive employment and the raising of 
the productivity and income of the traditional agricultural sector and the 
urban informal sector. This orientation should be linked, in the case of 
agriculture, with decisions relating, among other aspects, to the use of 
appropriate technologies, the tenure of land and assistance with techniques, 
credit, and marketing; in the case of industry, with the already-mentioned 
articulation between enterprises of different sizes; and regarding services, 
with the raising of their productive level within the sector or their transfer 
to others of greater productivity. Public investment should perform a decisive 
role in these processes —since it may be assumed that private investment will 
automatically seek out the most profitable modern strata— accompanied by the 
social expenditure of the State, which should pay special attention to the 
technical training of the marginated strata (reference is made to social 
policy later on). 
In sum, if it seems likely that the more dynamic sectors will not have 
sufficient pulling power, policy measures should be applied for the specific 
purpose of improving the living conditions of the marginated groups and, above 
all, their levels of employment and productivity. 
Respecting the relation of these policies with those of technological 
modification and expansionary adjustment, it is worth repeating what has 
already been said: namely, that they are not necessarily inconsistent and, on 
the contrary, may turn out to be mutually functional. Nonetheless, the greater 
or lesser emphasis placed on each element will give a particular bias to the 
strategy. This bias will be influenced, among other factors, by the values 
that guide the strategy and by the national circumstances. 
In those cases in which the modern sector is not important within the 
productive structure, and therefore has little influence on the rest, it would 
seem appropriate to concentrate efforts directly on the inarginated strata. 
Conversely, when the modern sector is significant and the marginated strata 
are not proportionately important, consideration might be given to a strategy 
centred on technological modification and expansionary adjustment, since it is 
probable that its spontaneous pulling mechanisms would be sufficient to 
achieve the desired objective. Even so, there are many national situations in 
the region which cannot be precisely characterized, or there exists (as in 
Brazil) an important modern productive sector alongside a considerable mass 
whose productivity and living conditions need to be raised. Hence the 
component of appraisal will always be crucial in the orientation of strategy. 
5. Capital accumulation 
At all events, whatever this orientation may be, it should be based on a 
considerable effort at capital accumulation, which will have to be above all 
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domestic, since, as already said, the external sources of financing have been 
weakened. This accumulation calls for major transformations in the patterns of 
saving and consumption, in the organization of the national financial systems 
and in the social distribution of the costs and benefits of development. 
Indeed, past experience has revealed the increasing inefficiency of the 
conventional mechanisms of accumulation in the region, based on a regressive 
redistribution of income. Whether it is that the strata that lose by this 
distribution frustrate its aims; or that the strata favoured by it assign 
their income not to reproductive accumulation but to consumption, speculation 
or investment abroad; or that the crisis and the political conflicts 
discourage potential investors, it is undeniable that the rate of investment 
shows no signs of recovery. New ways must be sought to achieve it, since 
without this recovery any strategy will be a mere expression of wishful 
thinking.54/ 
This is a very complex subject which does not admit of simplistic 
solutions. It should be stressed, however, that the development strategy, 
including the challenge of accumulation, postulates efforts and changes of 
such magnitude that it can only be achieved if the governments can count on 
the majority support of the population; and this support will only be obtained 
if the strategy is socially equitable as regards the distribution of costs and 
benefits. Reference has already been made to the concept of equity that should 
orient the strategy; this applies to capital accumulation, which constitutes 
its material base. If all participate in it, it may be assumed that all will 
feel themselves an integral part of the process that this makes possible, thus 
providing the social cohesion that it requires. In this way, through an 
equitable orientation of capital accumulation and the distribution of its 
fruits, the economic strategy would make a decisive contribution to the 
founding of the social cohesion which the strategy itself requires in order to 
advance. It is clear that inequitable strategies destroy social cohesion, 
sowing the seeds of their own destruction. As will be indicated later in 
dealing with some socio-political topics, the crisis, and the inequity of the 
policies applied to combat it, especially at its inception, have sharpened 
social conflicts, resentment and mutual distrust among the social groups. In 
such circumstances it is essential to restore social solidarity, which cannot 
be conceived as the subproduct of a successful strategy of economic growth, 
but as the starting point of its attainment. 
6. The external front 
This summarized version of some of the important economic elements of all 
strategies would not be complete without reference to the basic fact that 
their success largely depends on the occurrence of favourable changes in the 
international scene. As was stated by the countries of the region in the 
recent Declaration of the Latin American and Caribbean countries in Mexico,55/ 
this implies the adoption, by agreement with the developed countries, of a set 
of measures designed to reduce the external vulnerability of the economies of 
the region. These include the solution of the foreign debt problem through a 
political dialogue between creditors and debtors, based on the principle of 
co-responsibility and the right to development; a reform of the international 
monetary and financial system designed to overcome the imbalances that it 
produces and to foster the flow of external finance towards the countries of 
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the region; and a reform of the international trading system in order to 
reverse the protectionist policies of the industrialized countries. The 
Declaration makes clear that the governments of the latin American and 
Caribbean countries have already made an enormous effort, and that, to be able 
to continue it while responding to the varied domestic challenges and demands 
they have to meet, they need international co-operation in trade and finance. 
They also need to increase co-operation among themselves, reviving the 
integration efforts on new bases and joining forces to expand their bargaining 
power in international economic relations. 
This summarized and simple enumeration of some of the main elements that 
should be considered in every economic strategy merely seeks to serve as an 
introduction to the social policy. They represent an indispensable reference 
in all social policy. This, however, does not mean that social policy should 
be subordinated to economic policy, a persistent tendency in public policies 
which is accentuated in times of crisis. The ideal orientation of an 
integrated approach should be that which considers both aspects as constituent 
parts of a set of activities which is conditioned by the main objectives of 
development, these being as economic growth, autonomy, social integration, 
equity in distribution and democratic participation. 
B. THE FOUNDATIONS OF AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY TO ELTMDîATE 
SOCIAL DEFICITS 
Although action directed towards those groups whose lives are affected by 
various types of social exclusion is more fully developed, in this chapter, it 
should be pointed out that, just as economic action possesses several 
fundamental dimensions, such as modernization of technology and production, 
integration of the productive structure and equity in distribution, social 
policies must be developed in two main directions. The first of these involves 
the modernization and integration of all social groups into the processes of 
change and technological progress towards a relative homogenization of levels 
of productivity and income. The second lays stress on a set of measures 
designed to eliminate the most extreme forms of poverty and social exclusion. 
This aspect of the strategy is designed both to break the circuits by which 
poverty is reproduced among the new generations, and to achieve sighifleant 
progress towards creating equal opportunities for those groups left behind and 
implementing measures to directly attack the causes of social exclusion and 
segmentation. 
The strategy's starting point is its recognition of the considerable 
diversity of situations within the countries of the region. As the economic, 
social and cultural situations are manifold, national strategies must adapt 
themselves to the specific conditions in each country and to their changing 
circumstances. Moreover, there is already sufficient agreement as to the basic 
overall features which must characterize the region's own style of development 
in the future. Within this framework, the regional and social strategy put 
forward in this document has to be considered as a set of guidelines leading 
to the achievement of specific minimum social goals, and the actions set out 




The social strategy presented here is based upon an approach aimed at 
achieving three central objectives by means of integrated and selected action: 
a) the elimination of poverty, which has taken on a new and more acute 
dimension since the crisis; b) the improvement of the productive and social 
conditions of the •marginalized groups, as part of the effort to reduce social 
segmentation and achieve an equitable distribution of the benefits of future 
development and c) the incorporation into the socio-political processes, as 
fully active citizens, of those population groups essentially composed of the 
various categories of underprivileged, marginal and isolated strata which at 
present exist in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Such an approach demands complementary integration of economic and social 
policies; it is directly based upon the overall development strategy proposed 
by ECLAC, some of whose features were sketched out in previous pages. 
Moreover, a number of examples, which are to be found in several countries in 
the region, also help to provide an integral definition of social policies.56/ 
It should be stressed that education policies play a vital role in both 
of the social dimensions of the strategy. The close link between education and 
development is tied up with a complex social process in whose historical 
expression at least three fundamental features may be emphasized: a) the 
relationship with the values, attitudes and cultural patterns of society; b) 
the relationship with the process of strengthening civil society and 
specifically with its capacity to grant full citizenship to the great mass of 
the marginal and excluded population and c) the relationship with the 
requirements of a dynamic, modern and complex labour market.57/ 
As has already been pointed out, the development of a generally accepted 
set of social values which attaches importance to creative activity, cultural 
integration and the acquisition of technological skills is a basic feature of 
the process of modernization and integration of all the strata of society. 
Education plays a determining role in establishing links between civil society 
and the State, in training underprivileged strata to participate in decisions 
over those measures which affect their living conditions, in laying down 
minimum standards of solidarity and methods of social consultation which 
favour the national interest over private interest, with the aim of raising 
the standard of living of the population as a whole and avoiding social 
fragmentation. Finally, the link between education and work is of such 
complexity that it is not possible to examine it further here. However, it is 
quite clear that, in its simplest form, it involves providing human resources 
with sufficient educational training to adjust to the desired and foreseeable 
changes in production and passing on to the new generations the various 
expressions of the national cultural heritage as transmitted by the major 
codes of ccmmunication and knowledge, the historical heritage and forms of 
social organization and knowledge connected with specific local 
characteristics.58/ 
To sum up, as a result of the reduced leeway in terms of financial 
resources, the following concepts are becoming increasingly decisive to 
facilitate the overall strategy and specific social policies proposed in this 
document: creativity, autonomy, participation and consultation in the 
economic, social, political and cultural spheres of the countries of the 
region. 
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1. Same fundamental requirements for social policies 
a) Marginal groups: leading social actors and the object of policies 
The strategic dimensions presented in the previous section lead to the 
necessity of establishing specific policies for certain priority groups living 
in particularly vulnerable circumstances. In order to avoid making the error 
of considering these groups as the passive objects of action undertaken by 
governmental and non-governmental institutions and to highlight the importance 
which, on the contrary, is given to the aim of ensuring that the groups 
themselves take part in the preparation, execution and evaluation of such 
action, particular importance is attached to describing them as "social actors 
and as the objects of policies",59/ 
Bearing in mind existing social segmentation, the social groups 
identified in the following paragraphs were pinpointed as deserving priority 
action.60/ 
The indigenous population. In those countries where this population 
exists —or that sector- of the population set apart culturally by linguistic 
and cultural barriers (for example in the Caribbean countries) . It is among 
these groups that on average the most adverse indicators are recorded, in 
fields ranging from infant mortality to monetary income, and in which the task 
of integrating the new generations proves most arduous, in view of the limited 
and inadequate nature of the social services provided to them, 
The rural population. Most of this population lives in the least 
developed regions and countries. Notwithstanding the marked process of 
urbanization, it is estimated that towards 1985 40% of the population below 
the age of 5 lived in rural areas. Within this sector of the population there 
are acute deficiencies in food, health and education and it has so far been 
the victim of discrimination in the implementation of social policies. 
The poor urban population in non-metropolitan areas. With few exceptions, 
its average family income is below that of families in similar circumstances 
who live in capitals and cities which are poles of development. In addition, 
the quantity and qua], ity of the social service infrastructure in these areas 
is inferior to that of metropolitan areas, although in smaller cities the 
quality of services may improve as a result of community participation and 
greater devotion on the part of human resources. The implementation of dynamic 
job-creation policies and of policies to ixprove the quality of social 
services is a vital requirement for ensuring the social mobility of this 
population. 
The poor urban population in metropolitan areas living in circumstances 
of long-standing marginality. In all major cities, including those in 
countries which achieved high rates of growth in employment in past decades, 
certain social sectors were unable to enter the process of social mobility. 
For reasons of either limited linguistic knowledge, illiteracy and cultural 
marginal ity or for lack of minimum job training, sectors of adults have 
emerged which are ill-adapted to taking part in regular work, and which, 
through their families, reproduce a situation of permanent marginality in the 
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new generations. In order to integrate the new generations of these groups 
into society it is necessary to adopt a set of specific policies to provide 
attention during the stages of reproduction and cultural training of children 
and young people, in addition to household care. 
Female-headed families. In each of the above categories, those families 
whose head is a woman are the poorest and most likely to reproduce poverty and 
exclusion from one generation to the next. This group of families is growing 
rapidly both in rural and urban societies and in spite of the fact that it has 
been identified as being of high risk, government policies to protect it are 
either inexistent or extremely limited in their scope. 
b) The outline of the strategy 
Mechanisms for linking social policies 
It is possible to design many policy options or combinations to cover all 
of those aspects which seem relevant, and it is consequently fundamental to 
decide upon the emphases and priorities which are considered desirable and 
viable. Two aspects are of particular importance in designing social policies. 
One of these is time and the other concerns the co-ordination of policies 
between State institutions and the organizations belonging to civil society. 
The mechanisms used to define the time scale will necessarily distinguish 
between the short term on the one hand and the medium and long term on the 
other. 
The short term mainly concerns the circumstances associated with the 
particular stage which a given country has reached in its adjustment to the 
crisis. Within the short term, emergency policies will predominate, 
particularly food policies, the setting up of more complete care for the most 
vulnerable sectors of the population or social groups and emergency employment 
programmes. As will be seen later, in so far as possible, short-term policies 
should be designed in co-ordination with medium and long-term measures. In 
this manner, emergency policies will cease to merely provide assistance and 
will became elements of integrated long-term policies. 
From the angle of State action in the area of social policy, one of the 
most common shortcoming in the countries of the region is the lack of 
integration in the formulation and in the implementation of social policies. 
In almost all countries it will be necessary to take steps to overcome the 
deficiencies reflected in, for example, sectoral fragmentation, relations of 
clientage and the propensity to accumulate disjointed horizontal priorities, 
as these produce rigidities which make it impossible for society to operate as 
a unified whole. What is required is a means of setting up an authority which 
is capable of efficiently establishing vertical priorities or exercising real 
selectivity in the formulation of social policies which are co-ordinated with 
one another and linked with macroeconomic policies; it will be necessary to 
repeat this process in the implementation of policies. Regardless of the 
institutional form which each country considers most suitable, there is a need 
to establish integrated responsibility in the social area, so as to allow a 
hierarchy of objectives to be established, for the agencies responsible for 
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implementing policies. Finally, these measures of institutional integration 
will need to be complemented by action designed to facilitate, within 
reasonable periods of time, real participation on the part of underprivileged 
social groups in the preparation, implementation and evaluation of social 
policies within a process of democratization of the organization of social 
agencies, both at the levels of national planning and of implementation at the 
local level. 
Forms of implementation according to the various national contexts 
The specific design of the strategy and methods adopted for its 
implementation will vary depending on the differences in national 
circumstances and, in particular, on the development of productive forces 
already achieved as well as on the size and characteristics of the 
underprivileged groups. Not only do the countries possess different social 
and economic structures and varying degrees of technical and productive 
development, but also different types of policies and a diversity of social 
infrastructure. 
In those countries whose level of technical and productive development is 
relatively high, where social and other services are widespread and in which 
marginal groups are not large in number in comparison with the population, it 
is likely that stress will be laid on technical and productive modernization, 
the improvement of social institutions and greater integration of the various 
strata into the process.61/ Consequently, it would be desirable to strengthen 
social institutions, achieve greater co-ordination and efficiency and complete 
the range of services they already possess. 
In the case of several countries, including those which are most 
important in terms of productive infrastructure and population, and in which 
sharp dichotomies appear between the development poles and the remaining 
regions, between urban and rural areas and between those sectors which are 
included and those which are left behind by the modernization process, the 
high relative level of development of the productive forces is combined with a 
very large number of poor groups. In these cases, it will be necessary to 
accompany policies designed to modernize and integrate these groups into the 
productive structure with major social policies to simultaneously act upon a 
number of different features.62/ 
Finally, in those countries where development is least advanced and in 
small countries in which agriculture predominates, which possess a scanty 
social service infrastructure, where levels of extreme poverty and social 
marginalization are of a particularly large scale, emphasis should be laid on 
substantial growth of integrated social services, together with broad measures 
to support the creation of the local community infrastructure of basic 
services. Simultaneously, it will be necessary to combine action designed to 
improve the standard of living of the underprivileged sectors with the whole 
range of measures designed to improve their productivity and income.63/ 
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c) Policies to eradicate social deficits 
Family policies: nutrition, health and education: three keys to avoiding the 
reproduction of poverty in new generations 
The family deserves particular consideration as the focal point of social 
policies and as a strategic instrument for more efficiently implementing many 
of the measures considered as part of integrated programmes. In the past it 
was common to focus attention almost exclusively on individuals when analysing 
poverty. This accounted in part for the fragmentation and inefficiency of many 
social policies. However, the family, with its variety of structural features, 
undoubtedly represents the most important analytical unit, in so far as 
individuals' living conditions are more dependent upon the level of income 
—monetary and non-monetary— of the families to which they belong than on 
their own levels of income. As a strategic factor, the family constitutes a 
key unit in policy elaboration when it is considered from a dual perspective: 
that of achieving a considerable improvement among the groups of the 
population who benefit therefrom, and as a means of ensuring that they play an 
active part in implementing policies designed to avoid the reproduction of 
poverty among the new generations.64/ 
In this connection, nutrition, health and education represent three 
fundamental pillars among the set of basic requirements to avoid the 
reproduction of poverty in the new generations. Poverty and exclusion start to 
take form during pregnancy and subsequently depend on the care received at 
childbirth, on the food, health care and early stimulation received at the 
pre-school stage, as well as on the education, health and food received during 
the years of basic education. The vicious circle created by the culture which 
transmits poverty from one generation to the next illustrates the complex 
relationship between biological, social and cultural reproduction within the 
long cycle in which human beings are formed. It should also be mentioned that 
as societies become increasingly complex as a result of the processes of 
productive and technological modernization, urbanization and social change, 
the training received by individuals (including that acquired through 
non-conventional channels) has to be longer and more complete, as it 
determines to a great extent their future possibility of integrating into 
society.65/ 
Concern with nutrition has been expressed in concrete form through the 
various national food programmes which have been put into operation in several 
countries in the region. As examples of this, the programmes for the free 
distribution of food or for food subsidies implemented in Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela could be 
mentioned. The design of these programmes varies from one country to the next; 
some of them represent vast integrated programmes, while others are applied 
more selectively in determining which population groups are served. 
In view of the priority given to the family at the beginning of this 
section, mothers and children would most benefit from an integral programme 
for nutrition, health and education. Consequently, the main responsibility for 
implementing these programmes would be borne by institutions linked to the 
ministries of health and education. It might be suggested that these 
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activities be centred on places providing primary health care and on schools 
as an integral part not only of aspects which are of direct interest to the 
programmes but also of others linked with the human development of the family 
group; it would thereby be possible to establish communications between the 
relevant government bodies and those contexts, at the local level, in which 
fundamental problems involving family welfare occur» This would require that 
aspects of development policies linked to health and education be strengthened 
as well as more intense co-ordination with other sectors. Finally, it would 
involve stimulating interaction, even if this were initially restricted to the 
level of information, not only between the three basic needs mentioned above, 
but also between other aspects, such as housing and the services associated 
thereto, particularly water and environmental health.66/ 
Strategies designed to avoid the reproduction of poverty and inequality 
in the new generations must improve the biological, social and cultural 
formation of the new members of society, in order that they may reach adult 
life with a basic homogeneous set of qualities. These policies are directed at 
the family to eradicate the causes of infant mortality and, in general, of the 
diminution of the individual's capacity. The National Plan for Child Survival 
and Development in Colombia and Brazil's "Primero a Criança" programme, among 
others, constitute noteworthy examples of this type of policy. The importance 
which family education policies attribute to health during pregnancy, and to 
information and preparation for childbirth and child care, should be extended 
to early educational stimulation, the formation of language and pre-school 
education for children. In addition, educational programmes to help people 
assume their family responsibilities must also provide families with 
information on sexuality and reproduction in order, among other things, to 
avoid early pregnancies and increase the independence of women. 
As has been mentioned above, it should also be emphasized that integrated 
action to improve levels of nutrition, health and education in the vulnerable 
sectors, as well as other aspects of social welfare, must be applied in a 
manner which requires participation at the family and local community levels. 
Actions to satisfy basic needs and bring about the social integration of the 
marginal population 
This includes emergency policies whose aim is to create employment to 
produce social goods and services, policies involving training for work and 
citizenship (education and training for young people and adults) and policies 
to provide socially useful goods. 
In those countries where the level of unemployment is so high that it has 
been necessary to set up emergency employment programmes, it is vital that the 
various short, medium and long-term results which they are capable of 
achieving be harmonized. These projects should become one of the principal 
mechanisms for transferring income, not only through the temporary work which 
they directly create, but also through the basic social goods and services 
they produce. They thereby simultaneously improve the living conditions of the 
underprivileged sectors, create direct and indirect permanent employment and 
raise productivity and output.67/ 
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There is no doubt that these programmes are particularly important during 
the initial stages of irrplementation of policies to revitalize development, 
since by their very definition they remain in operation until the positive 
impact of development and consequent technical and productive modernization 
are fully felt on the domestic labour markets. However, in so far as they are 
designed to satisfy the needs of the poor, both by providing social and 
economic infrastructure as well as social services, they may have a 
considerable potential for integrating the various strata of the 
population.68/ The choice between a project which allows the short-term 
creation of plentiful but temporary work and another which does not 
immediately create so many jobs, but which, however, provides permanent 
employment, will depend upon the diagnosis made of the employment situation 
and the urgency with which immediate problems need to be solved. 
In concrete terms, these jobs would essentially be created by massive, 
multifaceted programmes, structured in accordance with the circumstances and 
overall plans of each country, within the following sectors: construction of 
low-cost housing? activities linked to the provision of infrastructure and 
services in the areas of education and health and those connected with food 
(irrigation and rural roads) and basic infrastructure (urban streets, water, 
drainage and electricity). 
On the basis of studies carried out in several countries in the region as 
part of the Regional Employment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(PREALC), it is possible to represent graphically the amount of temporary and 
permanent employment (direct plus indirect) which has been created by the 
projects of various sectors in the field of basic goods and social services 
(see figure 4). In virtually all cases, the projects involving the 
construction of low-cost housing have created most temporary employment, 
followed by projects in the field of education. As far as the creation of 
permanent employment is concerned, irrigation projects predominate, together 
with projects involving investment in education where the creation of direct 
permanent employment is greater than in any other sector —twice as high as in 
health, the next sector, and six times higher than in electricity projects.69/ 
With regard to the creation of indirect employment, PREALC indicates that 
this is considerably greater in the case of irrigation and road projects 
(thirteen tijtnes higher than in electricity, the only other sector of this type 
which is a major source of permanent indirect employment). This is largely due 
to the incidence of investments in irrigation and roads on the creation of 
jobs in agriculture (which accounts for its inportance for food and 
nutrition). Moreover, it is worth mentioning that in both cases this largely 
concerns rural employment; in that of irrigation, on account of the objectives 
intrinsic to the sector, and' in that of roads on account of the impact of 
projects for penetrating roads and for the construction and improvement of 
internal trunk roads. In this respect, it must be understood that investment 
in both sectors may initially seem less attractive when the problem facing the 
nation is that of acute urban unemployment, since there are frequently 
restrictions on the actual possibility of transferring workers geographically 
for long periods of time. Moreover, it should be mentioned that, since a high 
percentage of the labour force in rural areas in underemployment and extreme 
poverty is most acute in the traditional agricultural sector, the work created 
by the construction, maintenance and utilization of irrigation and rural roads 
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will be more useful in providing productive employment for sectors of the 
labour force which are at present underemployed. 
There is a wide variety of recent national experiences to provide 
reference points for the various combinations of programmes to generate 
employment while providing basic goods and social services to the lowest 
income sectors. In this respect, the sets of priority programmes in Colombia, 
Guatemala, Mexico and Peru among others, represent examples of the integrated 
type of programmes being proposed here, in which the local community takes 
part. Moreover, mention should be made of the experience of UNICEF, which, 
through its Basic Services Strategy, is sponsoring (with community support) 
social interventions in various countries of the region. The evaluations 
carried out so far point to significant rises in the standard of living of the 
sectors benefiting from this action, and a high cost-efficiency ratio.. The 
components of these programmes include support to production projects at a 
local level with an impact on nutrition and investment in community 
infrastructure, water supply and basic sanitation.70/ 
Policies to train individuals for productive life and citizenship (education 
and training of young people and adults) 
During the processes of productive and social change which took place 
from the 1960s up to the present crisis there took place what has been 
described as a "showcase" or "spurious" type of modernization, characterized 
by the short-lived reproduction of imported modernization, inadequate 
structural co-ordination and disparity in production and technology.71/ As has 
already been mentioned, past experience in the region suggests that part of 
the population òf working age, particularly in cities, was unable to enter the 
formal or modern sectors of the economy not only on account of the lack of 
jobs, but also because it lacked the appropriate skills. Another part has 
joined an informal sector with extremely low productivity which can only be 
raised by means of training, the provision of capital and measures designed to 
spark off processes of local innovation. 
During the present decade, it is, moreover, necessary to take into 
account the loss of educational and professional skill which has affected a 
considerable percentage of the labour force that has been out of work or 
unemployed for long periods of time. To this must be added the lack of the 
necessary training to occupy the manual and non-manual jobs being created as a 
result of the introduction of new technological patterns. Of equal importance 
are a series of training needs, deriving from the changes which are taking 
place in the administrative, financial and service fields as a result of the 
introduction of data processing; the technical and ecological changes in 
agriculture; the complexity of productive, administrative and social 
organizations; and the need to process information and decipher complex 
messages in order to fully assume citizenship.72/ 
Young people are particularly affected by the situation described above. 
Approximately one third of the Latin American labour force is made up of young 
people between the ages of 10 and 24. In addition, it should be stressed that 
almost 60% of them live in urban areas, and the rates of economic 
participation for young people between 14 and 24 are 46% in the urban area and 
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52% in the rural area. Open unemployment is particularly acute among young 
people in urban areas, where it is common for them to comprise 50% of the 
total. Moreover, underemployment among young people possesses perhaps even 
more alarming characteristics, since it mainly affects marginal young people 
and young people from low-income strata and since, on account of its 
characteristics, it helps to maintain and reproduce the vicious circle of 
critical poverty.73/ 
This accounts for the importance attached to education and social 
policies.74/ With regard to education policies, it is desirable to lay stress 
on the creation and strengthening of itiultifaceted and flexible systems which 
make it possible to meet very dissimilar needs and involve the active 
participation of non-governmental social organizations, together with 
important systems of agreement with enterprises.75/ 
Among the major types of action, mention can be made of the following:76/ 
- A large-scale effort to promote the education and training of 
unemployed young people. In several countries of the region, young people are 
out of work for long periods, which results in anti-social and anemic 
behaviour. In other countries, they have been incorporated into emergency 
employment programmes. Such programmes could at one and the same time provide 
young people with: the basic knowledge they need to serve as labour 
apprentices (if they have not finished primary school); and vocational 
training in a number of simple activities, such as maintenance and repair work 
which are currently carried out in a technically incompetent manner in the 
region. 
- Measures to strengthen, or to set up, where they do not exist, 
professional training institutions fundamentally dedicated to developing 
skills and techniques to train young people as future workers and integral and 
adaptable members of modern society, which constitutes a vital factor in the 
processes of industrial reorganization and technical and productive 
modernization. This would ensure a flexible labour supply capable of adapting 
to the changing needs of the productive apparatus. Worthwhile examples of this 
are provided by the national training schemes in Brazil, Colombia and Costa 
Rica. 
- The establishment of a number of agreements with enterprises so that 
young people can receive apprentice training in them either by alternating 
their studies with work or in training sessions. The expectations for success 
in the region are considerable since agreements of this kind are virtually 
non-existent at present and the enterprises could increase productivity by 
training and selecting young people with a better educational profile than 
that of previous generations. 
- In the case of unemployed young people with middle level education, 
their skills may be tapped in programmes which, while similar to the present 
emergency employment programmes, concentrate on jobs which are of use to the 
society at large. The programmes to avoid the reproduction of poverty referred 
to earlier in this document provide broad scope for educated young people 
without jobs, who could be employed more productively in this type of 
programme than if they were put to manual labour in the existing programmes. 
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- Encouragement for activities based on solidarity between young students 
and young rural adults, young members of indigenous groups or of 
under-privileged urban sectors, which would help the former to gain an 
awareness of the problems facing the others and which would allow youiKj people 
from the most under-privileged groups to acquire the means of creating their 
own specific forms of youth organization and expression. Noteworthy among 
these activities are programmes of the type in which one young person educates 
another or in which a young person helps a child, which mobilizes the best-
educated strata to help training those with less education. 
With regard to the training of adults, the measures adopted could be 
integrated with the training of young people. In addition, the following 
activities could be mentioned, among others: 
- Training for State personnel, which would involve specific programmes 
directed to personnel at the operative, technical and administrative levels. 
Increased efficiency of the State is vital for the success of the strategy. 
- Encouraging enterprises to act on their own or through sectoral 
chambers or associations to undertake regular staff training programmes. The 
experience of the region shows that medium- and small-scale enterprises and, 
in particular, enterprises in the traditional sectors of production, do not 
have recourse to vocational training services. An all-inclusive policy would 
result not only in greater efficiency in production but also in occupational 
mobility, since it would enable people with less formal education to make up 
for this through professional training and thereby gain access to more highly 
skilled and better paid jobs. 
- The activities could also take into consideration (which they now do 
only infrequently) vocational training for people in the informal sector. 
Programmes in support of this sector have shown the positive results that can 
be obtained by training people engaged in micro-businesses. These programmes 
consist in the granting of loans and technical assistance, following an 
economic evaluation of the projects with the beneficiaries themselves, and in 
follow-up action on the project over a given period. The support provided has 
taken the form of training in minimum notions of evaluation techniques, 
accounting, marketing and production. In this respect, the experience gained 
in Colombia through the "National Micro-business Programme", which has been 
carried out with the participation of private foundations in association with 
the chambers of commerce under the co-ordination of the National Planning 
Department, provides a noteworthy example which could also be applied to 
youth. Similarly, mention should be made of the recent creation of the 
Informal Sector Institute in Peru, which provides members of this sector with 
credit and technical advice previously unavailable to them. 
Policies to provide goods needed for socially useful production 
Intensive training programmes must be complemented by policies to provide 
goods needed for socially useful production. Within the integrated strategy 
proposed to overcome social deficits, these policies would pursue the dual 
purpose of producing the goods and services which would increase the levels of 
income and well-being of those employed in the emergency employment programmes 
40 
proposed above, and of generating a larger number of jobs for the medium-
income groups whose standard of living has also suffered as a result of the 
crisis. 
As has already been mentioned, collective investment to improve the 
standard of living of the under-privileged is of high priority. If these 
groups are to attain acceptable minimum standards of living, it is necessary 
to make a considerable effort for the provision of urban infrastructure, basic 
health and education services, drinking water and waste-disposal facilities, 
and to set up peripheral health services, day-care centres and integrated 
school units, services for personal hygiene, space for physical and cultural 
recreation and means of transportation. These measures should provide a 
cornerstone for the organization and participation of the carnmunities who 
benefit therefrom, which requires making full use of all the intermediate 
organizations which constitute civil society, such as non-governmental 
institutions, churches, co-operatives and collective organizations which 
possess considerable capacity to mobilize and foment social involvement as 
well as other types of popular organizations.77/ 
Attributing priority to collective infrastructure, which implies 
rationalizing the use made of funds and encouraging greater participation by 
the beneficiaries, in no way means that the serious housing problem, which is 
far from being easy to solve in cities whose rate of growth has remained above 
4% per year for three decades, should be set aside. Construction is at one and 
the same time a means of reactivating the economy without spending more 
foreign currency and of immediately providing semi-skilled jobs, and for this 
reason it is considerably important for short-term development. Nevertheless, 
savings and credit mechanisms for housing have remained inaccessible to poor 
sectors, who lack payment capacity, and the subsidies granted have in many 
cases ended up by benefiting the members of medium- and upper-income groups. 
These considerations indicate the need to devote public funds to collective 
equipment and to net transfers for popular housing. As it will not be possible 
to fully meet potential demand in the short termr it will be necessary to 
adopt rigid selection criteria in choosing the beneficiaries and to 
simultaneously maintain a system of unsubsidized saving and credit for the 
middle- and upper-income groups. 
Mention should also be made of the population's basic social security. 
The system adopted in the majority of countries was based on the social 
security model which assumes that there is a regular salaried population most 
of whom provide contributions, which has excluded large sectors of informal 
workers. Moreover, the contributions by the population covered by the system 
are backed by considerable financial contributions which are in most cases 
provided by indirect taxation. The organization of a universal social security 
system implies a careful selection of the services which can be provided, on 
the basis of the available resources, in order to improve the quality of the 
human resources and extend the protection which the whole family must receive 
in the face of unforeseen circumstances preventing it from meeting its basic 
needs. This means that priority should be given to basic health policies and 
policies providing protection in respect of congenital or acquired disability, 
death of the provider, and also for families whose head is a woman with low 
income.78/ 
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2. Improved co-ordination of the State apparatus and increased 
mass participation 
a) Overcoming the institutional difficulties of social policy 
Although some progress has been made in the region with respect to social 
policies aimed at the disadvantaged classes and in some cases institutions 
exist whose principal objective is to improve the situation of vulnerable 
families, a number of difficulties still remain to be overcome. Many of these 
are attributable to more general problems; for example, there is still a 
gravely erroneous perception of the role of overall social policies in the 
development process. Moreover, social policies tend to be fragmented 
sectorally and their effectiveness considerably diluted; also, the sector 
concerned with poor families generally occupies a relatively marginal position 
within the politico-administrative structure of the State. 
While there has been undoubted progress over the last twenty years in 
terms of the perception of the relationship between social planning and 
economic planning or between economic development and social development, the 
practice often lags behind the conceptual formulation and priority is given to 
strictly economic aspects on the premise that the economic results achieved 
will lead to social improvements; such an approach tends to consider social 
policies as subordinated to economic policies, 
Moreover, although the scope of social policies has been extended, its 
nucleus is still determined by the traditional perception of "the social" in 
relation only to the so-called "social sectors", namely, education, health, 
housing and social security. Scant attention is paid to the role of social 
groups in the development process, to society's options vis-à-vis these 
groups, and to proper emphasis on persons who belong to vulnerable groups as 
an objective of the society and as active participants in its development and 
transformation. In these circumstances, it is difficult to conceive of social 
policies as a coherent set of measures that are broader in scope than purely 
sectoral measures, without denying'the importance of the latter. 
The perception of social policies as the sum of sectoral actions dilutes 
the effectiveness of such actions since they are carried out by different 
agencies with little co-ordination among them. The consequence of this 
sectoral fragmentation is that, although there may be a health policy, an 
education policy, a housing policy, etc., there is no integrated social policy 
aimed at specific social groups. Social policies are not geared towards 
problems; they distinguish instead between the various administrative agencies 
that cater to social needs. Consequently, the formulation of social policies 
is based on the premise that the family resolves difficulties connected with 
the early infancy of a member with the help of the ministry of health, and 
where pre-school educational activities exist, these come under the 
responsibility of the ministry of social welfare. When children and young 
people reach school age they are then supposedly under the protection of the 
ministry of education, which sees to their academic training, while other 
aspects, such as social welfare and the utilization of spare time, come within 
the portfolio of the ministry of social welfare or the ministry of youth 
affairs. After this phase, they become adults and their future prospects 
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depend on economic policy and their protection on the ministry of labour, 
until they reach old age when, once again, they come under the responsibility 
of the ministries of welfare and social security. It is understood that the 
ministry of education organizes cultural activities for the student population 
as a whole, supplemented by a cultural diet of museums, theatres, music, etc., 
aimed generally at the middle and upper classes. The result of this sectoral 
fragmentation and the accumulation of horizontal priorities of social policies 
is that there remains a wide range of needs of the families of groups which 
are disadvantaged or excluded from the society, in the areas of health, 
nutrition, housing, social security, training for employment, and income, 
which are not met by the State. 
In turn, the sectoral fragmentation of social policies is closely related 
to the separation of the politico-administrative structure from those sectors 
principally concerned with the welfare of disadvantaged families. Generally 
speaking, both those social policies aimed at broad social integration and 
chose that are more selective, are affected by the "client" relationship 
between the institutions of the politico-administrative structure and 
organized social groups, whether broad-based or comprising specific population 
groups. Normally, these social groups, which are already linked to existing 
public institutions, develop into pressure groups and tend to retain the same 
kind of orientation found in the service itself. In view of the fragmentation 
of social policies and the fact that their application to disadvantaged 
families is severely limited, access to their benefits by those social groups 
which have the greatest difficulties in organizing themselves, such as the 
urban poor, is blocked by insurmountable obstacles. 
This situation can still be observed in certain cases in ministries of 
education, which plan policies on the basis that all children and young people 
are covered by their services. However, a high percentage of their "clients" 
is, in fact, excluded from their services and is attended to by no one, if 
account is taken of the high dropout rate in the primary school system and, to 
a lesser degree, in some sections of the secondary school system. Since these 
groups should have been included in the education system, when they are not, 
they are treated as if they did not exist. There are also cases in which, when 
informal education policies, such as night schools, are implemented, they are 
intended for the education of adults and not to satisfy the educational needs 
of young people, although it is quite common to see young people from poorer 
sectors representing mors than half of total enrolment in such 
institutions.79/ 
The difficulties faced by Latin America and the Caribbean in overcoming 
institutional shortcomings of social policy confront the State with the 
problem of obtaining effective authority in the elaboration of social policies 
in order to establish vertical priorities and to expand its capacity to 
rationally organize its programmes with a view to enhancing both its 
effectiveness and its efficiency. There is therefore urgent need for an 
institutional organization that would integrate and co-ordinate social 
policies both internally and vis-à-vis economic policies. Emphasis also needs 
to be placed on enhancing the effectiveness of the technical and 
administrative management of social institutions, through the use of suitable 
methods of programming, systematic and integrated information systems and 
functional training. 
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b) Increased participation of other forms of grassroots organization 
In recent years, Latin America and the Caribbean have witnessed the 
emergence of a large number of non-governmental institutions whose activities 
are geared towards development. These institutions work with sectors of the 
population living in conditions of acute poverty and employ new techniques of 
social work that rely on community participation and on autonomy in the search 
for solutions to their problems. They have proven to be highly effective. At 
the same time, in the face of the increasing deterioration of their living 
conditions, the poorest sectors themselves have demonstrated an unusual 
capacity to recompose their social fabric arid to establish other forms of 
popular organization with very diverse aims and composition. 80/ Taken 
together, however, these institutions constitute a fragmented and isolated 
entity which does not have the necessary mechanisms to co-ordinate activities 
within itself and with the public sector. 
This is why it is so necessary to create intermediate institutions 81/ 
between citizens and the State; mobilization of domestic resources for the 
elaboration and implementation of social policies, decentralized application 
of public policies, community participation; technical assistance by 
non-governmental agencies to social programmes and widening of the scope of 
operations, which will result in a policy of social development that is more 
functional, effective and has wider participation.82/ 
C. THE SCCEO-POLTTICAL CONDITIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
1. Need for greater social integration 
A development strategy whose objectives embrace processes of modernization in 
technology and in systems of production, and efficient methods for integration 
into the international economy accompanied by greater social justice, requires 
not only firm action by the government but also close co-operation among all 
social groups aimed at promoting and achieving these objectives. In this 
respect the societies of Latin America and the Caribbean are facing a twofold 
challenge: on the one hand, to come up with positive solutions to the crisis, 
both in its current acute manifestations and in its structural, underlying 
causes? on the other hand, to adjust to the profound changes which are in 
store. The attitude of the various social groups which make up the societies 
of Latin America and the Caribbean constitutes the social basis for the 
changes and transformations that are needed. These groups may be favourably 
disposed towards change or, on the contrary, may resist some necessary 
transformations. It must be borne in mind that all change leads to 
modifications in relations between social groups and gives rise to new social 
relations, which are seldom free of conflict or friction. A good example is 
provided by the crisis of the 1980s, which took place at a time in which much 
of the economy of Latin America and the Caribbean was in a phase of 
restructuring of the model that had been followed up to around the 1970s. 
Through this restructuring, an attempt was made to place external relations on 
a new footing and to introduce new modalities of domestic development, which 
called for complex processes that led to social and political conflicts whose 
solution, in some cases, resulted in the use of authoritarian formulas. The 
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modalities of the relationships between the various economic and social groups 
were also changed and the existing levels of social cohesion altered, without 
any success in definitively establishing new systems of stable social 
relations. Since the State had traditionally played a key role in establishing 
the patterns of social relations, and consequently in social integration, the 
new assumption was that the market should also play an important, or perhaps 
decisive, role in this process. This could explain the tendency to privatize 
the traditional functions of the State in the areas of housing, health, 
education, inter alia. All of this meant the restructuring of previous 
relationships, which had an impact on the existing levels of social cohesion, 
since the traditional mechanisms for the integration of many classes in the 
society were weakened. On the other hand, the trend towards the concentration 
of income tended to become more marked, in general, while the more 
disadvantaged sectors did not benefit from any mechanism to compensate for the 
relative deterioration of their material situation. Experience has shown that, 
in implementing specially designed policies, both in the modalities of such 
implementation and in their results, particular emphasis must be placed on 
their capacity to improve social cohesion, which means that all parties 
concerned should see that potential sacrifices and successes are really 
shared. 
As the diagnostic section of this study has attempted to show, alongside 
the obvious successes of the process of growth in the region in recent decades 
there are also the deficiencies that constitute the fundamental problem of the 
region. An undeniable gap persists between the rural and urban areas and 
"pockets of backwardness" are often formed which tend to reproduce the 
unsatisfactory conditions of existence that characterize them. On the other 
hand, the characteristics of modernization are also not fully present in the 
cities. In tackling the problems of the social integration of rural areas, the 
problem must be faced of the relationship between the enterprise economy and 
the peasant economy and the modalities of development of both. Entrepreneurial 
agriculture, despite its purely economic successes, seems not to be the most 
suitable vehicle for promoting a process of comprehensive transformation, and 
the peasant economy, although it provides a means of subsistence, does not 
itself possess the dynamism to promote far-reaching changes. 
While there undoubtedly exist in urban areas symbols of modernity, 
experiences of upward social mobility and adherence to new norms of conduct, 
these are not the same for all classes; heterogeneity is a strikingly manifest 
characteristic in most cities of the region. Moreover, alienation and urban 
poverty are permanent phenomena and, in many cases, the absolute numbers of 
those affected are on the rise. It is also common knowledge that, 
notwithstanding the experiences of social mobility, the gap between the 
richest and the poorest groups is widening. 
In addition, there is general awareness of the effects on social 
integration caused by changes in the formerly traditional mechanisms of 
integration, mainly the educational system, which, notwithstanding its 
achievements, has reintroduced areas of differentiation that are often sharply 
defined. Consumption patterns also tended to accentuate the differences 
between the life styles of the various classes. All of this gives rise to the 
deep and very visible segmentation both between and within the various social 
groups. The return to private ownership of many services, which in some 
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measure had promoted integration within the society, helped to accentuate the 
differences with the result that, in many cases, the particularities of groups 
became more pronounced. All of this means that any development strategy 
enjoying broad popular support must be based on policies that promote greater 
social cohesion and greater integration of the different classes. 
2. Need to equip the State to meet the challenges of the new strategy 
There is general agreement on the need to adapt the functioning of the State 
apparatus to the demands of the new strategies that are being elaborated to 
overcame not only the obstacles that have arisen from the crisis of the 1980s, 
but also the economic, social and political problems that have been 
accumulating in most of the countries of the region. 
The State has always played a particularly important role in the region; 
it has even been said that in some countries the national societies are 
largely the creation of the state. 83/ There is no need to return to the 
distant past to appreciate the major role of the State in the process of 
industrialization, or more broadly speaking, in the promotion of policies to 
develop the domestic market, which occurred in some countries after the 1929 
crisis and in others during the post world war II period. 
Historical experience shows that the State has played a vitally important 
role in processes of social integration and, particularly, in the promotion of 
social justice. These processes are concerned both with the redistribution of 
the fruits of development, which the State can help to make more efficient, 
and with the life styles and values shared by the national community as a 
group. The experience of the region shows that, in the absence of firm action 
by the State, social integration and social justice are not a natural 
consequence of the spontaneous dynamism of the economy. Firm action by the 
State in this area is therefore necessary in order to implement strategies 
that effectively promote social justice. 
Moreover, the Latin American experience shows that the State has always 
played an important role in the economy by promoting economic processes, 
creating favourable conditions for the development of the various sectors of 
the economy and by undertaking activities which the private sector could not 
easily undertake. Among the economic problems which clearly require action by 
the State is that which relates to the need to create jobs in order to combat 
the recession brought on by the crisis. In view of the scale of investment 
required and the magnitude of the problems, the private sector would have 
difficulty in undertaking it alone. Furthermore, as is well-known, the crisis 
has coincided with a large-scale readjustment of technological and productive 
methods. All of this requires a capacity for action by the State not only in 
the strictly economic field but also in areas such as formal education, the 
acquisition of new skills, the identification of current processes, 
information about such processes, etc. As already mentioned, it is not enough 
to link the strategies designed to combat the crisis to an economic recovery; 
what are also needed are changes in the orientation of such strategies and 
consequently the creation of vigorous stimuli which are not necessarily 
present in society as it exists today. 
"ó 
The crisis once again underscored the vulnerability of national economies 
to external factors; there is need for State action in this area if those 
economies are to have a greater degree of autonomy in the future. Just as at 
the socio-political level, where it is accepted that the State should play a 
key role in maintaining national sovereignty vis-à-vis foreign entities, the 
role of the State in the preservation and construction of economic sovereignty 
must also be recognized. 
In short, a strategy aimed at creating dynamic economies with a capacity 
to be autonomous and to create mechanisms that promote forms of social justice 
will require significant State participation. Such participation, however, 
cannot take place on the margin or outside the framework of the society; on 
the contrary, the problem is to create a type of society that is reflected 
through the State, in so far as the latter constitutes one of the principal 
forms of organization of the society. 
There has been some controversy recently concerning the way in which our 
societies should be organized: if its organization derives from the operation 
of the market and, consequently, the role of the State is to ensure that its 
smooth functioning is not disrupted, or whether its form of organization 
should be based on a structure composed of the dynamic private and public 
agents of the economy. Indeed, Latin American society has become considerably 
diversified and different groups are able to organize themselves and express 
their demands. This is why we refer to a type of State that expresses the 
capacity of the society to organize itself —without situating itself on the 
fringe of that society™ in such a way as to facilitate interaction between 
all existing classes and with a system of organization that flows from the 
interaction of the various groups. 
The task is clearly not an easy one. A democratic project presupposes the 
intention to include not only the immediate demands and aspirations of the 
various sectors that comprise a society, but also the objective of 
constructing a shared future. The democratic aspiration, and hence the 
recognition of the diversity not only of the present but also possibly of the 
future, seeks to maintain the necessary social cohesion by exploring ways of 
achieving consensus on basic issues, which, however, does not stifle the 
creativity that is vital to any future and which is effectively expressed in 
the diversity of existing options. 
However, in order to tackle the tasks referred to above, the democratic 
State needs to enhance its capacity and effectiveness. It is first necessary 
to strengthen the State's capacity for action in the economic field. The 
challenges of the crisis mean that there is need to undertake tasks such as 
generating the necessary accumulation of capital to effect the necessary 
changes, providing protection and assistance to new activities that are 
considered to be most dynamic from a strategic point of view, creating the 
infrastructure on which such activities are based and promoting and orienting 
the necessary technological changes. Moreover, all change brings with it 
dislocations of various sorts, and the State must of course try to mitigate 
and correct them. It is difficult to say in each case which will be the most 
suitable mechanisms for strengthening the economic capacity of the State, but 
it may be said that, generally speaking, such mechanisms include the proper 
use of the instruments of economic policy, direct productive investment and 
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control as well as the orientation of public and private financial mechanisms. 
The most appropriate combination can only be suggested in very specific 
circumstances. 
The political capacity of the State also needs to be strengthened. The 
State must ensure that the prevailing institutional order reconciles as far as 
possible the diverse interests that exist in a society. The political capacity 
of the State basically means its readiness to exercise its authority over all 
social groups; however, this capacity cannot be based only or mainly on 
coercion, but rather on principles that confer legitimacy to its mandates. For 
this to be possible, democratic political principles must be observed so that 
the authority that emanates from the State is the expression and 
representation of the society. The existence of democratic political and 
institutional systems and respect for them in the society, will make it 
possible to achieve a high degree of responsibility and of individual and 
collective discipline, which will form the basis of a vigorous and stable 
political capacity of the State. 
In the countries of the region, power, wealth and income have tended to 
be concentrated in the hands of the few, while other groups are excluded from 
the fruits of development, which exacerbates social conflicts. The State has 
had to confront these conflicts, as well as problems arising from the new 
options of change and growth, to the degree that the latter lead to 
transformations that affect already established positions. On the other hand, 
it is very common for a gap to develop between the concrete achievements of a 
style of development and the expectations of the various social groups, thus 
giving rise to tension since the results achieved do not live up to the 
subjective demands of the various groups. The State needs to strengthen its 
capacity to promote social integration since the problems referred to above 
arise because the consensus is broken in so far as social interests tend to be 
viewed not only as conflicting but also, and very often, as mutually 
exclusive. 
It is therefore necessary for each group to rise above its own vested 
interests in favour of a global project to which a large majority of the 
society subscribes. In the acceptance of such a project, education has played 
and can continue to play an important role in promoting common values. In 
addition to values, however, there is also the question of creating 
institutions that can be seen as elements of a common identity. It suffices, 
for example, to mention the importance of a judicial system with broad 
functions operating in a non-discriminatory manner and with a sense of 
equality. 
It must be stressed that social integration cannot by itself resolve the 
problem of incorporating the excluded, but —particularly in societies that 
are already diversified— the establishment of a principle of common identity 
is what makes social cohesion possible, lhe prevalence of corporative policies 
in the various social groups threatens not only the functioning of the 
political system, but also the possibility of achieving stable consensuses, 
which require more than good negotiation of immediate interests in order to be 
achieved. 
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To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, which means enhancing the 
capacity of the State in various areas —economic measures, external 
relations, social integration and political authority— it is also necessary 
to improve the technical and administrative effectiveness of the State 
apparatus. With these aims in view, efficiency is not achieved merely by 
further rationalizing the bureaucratic system —although that too is 
important—, but it must also be measured in terms of the social effectiveness 
of the overall action of the State. This requires the greatest possible 
harmonization of the action of the State with the objectives which should 
govern its action. There is also need for unity and internal coherence between 
the various agents that comprise the State. The technical and administrative 
effectiveness of the State poses problems that are difficult to resolve and 
requires a certain degree of independence vis-à-vis agents which are external 
to the State apparatus, that would enable it to rise above a narrow or 
sectoral perspective and to develop an overview which represents the general 
interests of the national community. Through its technical and administrative 
management, the State must combine technical organization with decision-making 
processes involving many authorities, both State and private, thus combining 
technical organization, political organization and bureaucratic organization. 
3. The strategy and the requirements of democracy 
A new development strategy cannot be conceived merely as the will to act, 
however well intentioned this may be, on the part of the technical and 
bureaucratic sectors that make up the State apparatus. As mentioned before, it 
requires the active and conscious participation of the entire population that 
is affected by the process. For this to take place, there is need for 
institutional structures that can make this participation possible and 
consolidate the democratic aspirations that have been continuously expressed 
in the countries of the region. 
However, there is no denying a fact which stands out as a paradox in 
modern societies; that is, a growing demand for democratization in conditions 
which make it increasingly difficult to achieve democracy. These obstacles 
—it is said— are peculiar to the process of modernization. In almost every 
case, this process has meant the existence of large organizations —State 
agencies, trade unions, political organizations, entrepreneurial 
organizations, etc.— all of which, because of their structure, tend to assume 
bureaucratic forms which, as a method of operation, are based on different 
premises from that which underlie a democratic system, 
In addition to this bureaucratization, there is the fact that 
contemporary societies are so complex that it requires specialized technical 
skills in order to function. This creates a difference between those who 
possess such specialized skills and those who do not, which also constitutes 
an obstacle to the proper democratic and participatory functioning of the 
society. 
At the political and ideological level problems are also encountered. The 
challenge is to develop a democratic line of thinking which is capable of 
responding to the demands of the underprivileged classes, offers a solution to 
the existing social differences and opens channels of expression for the 
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conflicts that are inherent in any process of change. There is therefore need 
to conceive of a political and institutional system that can accompany the 
process of transformation. 
lhe prevalent view in latin America and the Caribbean of the rights of 
citizens has been the duty of the society, and particularly of the State, to 
ensure that certain basic demands associated with social existence are 
satisfied. !he social rights of the citizen —guaranteed access to education, 
housing, health services, etc.— have been given precedence over so-called 
civil rights. This claim, which is addressed to the State, will probably 
continue to be made in the near future and will perhaps become even more 
insistent, although it is not expected to be satisfied in the conditions in 
which it has been hitherto, in fact, the joint demands for representation and 
participation have become more insistent, which poses considerable problems 
for the juridico-political institutions. This makes it necessary to create 
mechanisms for direct and undelegated representation as well as specific 
forums in which these demands can be expressed. In the area of economic 
relations, it means the creation of decision-making mechanisms that provide 
for direct representation of the groups involved, which in turn requires 
collective and organized forms of actions. 
The predominance of the demand for social rights by citizens sometimes 
gives rise to a false choice between a substantive democracy and a formal 
democracy, in which more importance is attached to the concrete satisfaction 
of certain demands than to the political and institutional mechanisms used to 
satisfy them. Nevertheless, experience has shown that it is extremely 
important to reconcile these two aspects, since the achievements of 
substantive democracy need to be formalized by institutions so that they would 
not become the mere expression of personal decisions. Moreover, its continued 
existence is guaranteed by the fact that they are institutions accepted by the 
society as a whole. 
On the other hand, the formalization of rights provides the society as a 
whole with a system of norms and values to govern its conduct. The existence 
of a formal democratic system, reflected in institutions and juridical norms, 
helps to streamline the functioning of the society, which is extremely 
important for the stability of any political system. 
One of the most burning issues in contemporary democratic demands is that 
of participation in the exercise of power. This requires that the instruments 
of power, such as political parties and the so-called intermediate agents, 
should permit the establishment within their structures of genuine forms of 
representation and participation. On the other hand, there is also need in 
certain circumstances for a certain degree of decentralization of power. To 
the extent that power is too centralized, the gap between the governing groups 
and the governed tends to widen and important decisions are taken by a small 
number of people. While participation in the decision-making process leads to 
decentralization, it cannot be a process of decentralization in less important 
areas. Decentralization is a complex process of diffusion of responsibility 
which carries with it the idea that, however limited the sphere in which 
decisions are taken, there is a broader responsibility that transcends the 
particular nature of the situation and of the groups affected. 
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Bearing in mind that the functioning of modern societies requires 
collective and organized forms of action, it is necessary to ensure that the 
political system permits the greatest possible degree of représentâtivity, so 
that there is a genuine coincidence of views between the government and the 
governed. The problems of representation in parties, parliament and 
government, as well as in other institutions, are major problems in any 
democracy. To ensure that participation is not merely formal, there is need 
for considerable development of the awareness of citizens, and anything that 
limits the independence of this awareness or restricts intellectual 
development constitutes an obstacle. 
If the interests of the various groups are to be expressed in the 
society, it is necessary to conceive of the relationship between the society 
and the State in its broader sense, as a process of forming and continuously 
advancing beyond shifting equilibria. The forms of social agreement or 
consensus may be extremely varied and may range from very specific matters to 
decisions that affect the current style of development and of the society 
whose creation is being sought. It must be pointed out that, although a 
process of harmonization may seek to establish economic and social agreements 
between sectors or organized groups, in the last resort such agreements must 
be ratified and legitimatized by the State. In the countries of the region, 
the participation of the State in this process of harmonization does more than 
merely legitimize the agreement, since, in view of the fact that most of the 
economies are mixed, the State is also involved as a party to the agreement 
and must play the role of mediator and participant at the same time. 
In latin America and the Caribbean it must be remembered that there are 
important social groups whose capacity to organize themselves and to secure 
representation for their interests is undeveloped, which is why harmonization 
should not legitimize existing conditions. On the other hand, it is also 
peculiar to the situation in the region that harmonization cannot be limited 
merely to the management of development, but that it includes issues of 
economic growth, political participation, social integration, and 
institutional stability, inter alia; this makes it even more necessary to be 
aware of the mutual dependence between social co-ordination and political 
co-ordination. 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA (TEN COUNTRIES) : DISTRIBUTION OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPUTATTON 
BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, 1960, 1970, 1980 a/ 
Nan-manual groups 
Manual groups in the secondary 
and tertiary sectors 
Workers providing 
personal services 
Manual groups in the 
primary sector 
Total 
Argentina Uruguay Chile Panama Costa Rica 
1960 1970 1980 1963 1975 1960 1970 1980 1960 1970 1980 1960 1970 1980 
39.4 37.3 42.7 38.8 38.6 22.8 32.2 36.8 21.2 23.1 31.9 23.4 24.4 30.9 
34.2 37.4 34.4 31,7 33.2 33.6 35.3 32.8 18.4 24.9 25.7 19.3 26.2 24.9 
9.9 10.4 12.3 14,0 11.8 13.7 11.8 12.7 12.1 13.3 12.1 10.3 12.5 16.1 
16.5 14.4 10.6 15 .5 16.4 30.4 24.4 17.8 48 .3 38.7 30.3 47.0 36.8 27.9 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Non-manual g r o u p s 
Manual g r o u p s i n t h e s e c o n d a r y 
and t e r t i a r y s e c t o r s 
Workers p r o v i d i n g 
p e r s o n a l s e r v i c e s 
Manual g r o u p s i n t h e 
p r i m a r y s e c t o r 
T o t a l 
B r a z i l Peru Ecuador Honduras Bo l iv i a 
1960 1970 1980 1960 1970 1981 1962 1974 1982 1961 1974 1983 1950 1976 
15.2 19.8 27.3 19 .1 2 4 . 1 32.3 14.6 2 0 . 1 27.9 11.0 21.0 2 5 . 1 7 .6 21.5 
22.9 23.4 29.3 21.4 24 .3 19 .1 21.3 23.6 27.9 11.2 19.5 21.5 13.3 23.9 
7.2 10.2 12.7 9.5 8 .5 8.0 7.0 7 .5 7 .0 8 .5 6.7 11.0 6 .5 6.8 
54.7 46 .5 30.7 50.2 43.2 40 .6 5 7 . 1 48 .8 37.2 69.3 52.8 42.4 72 .6 49.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
S o u r c e : ECLAC, on t h e b a s i s o f s p e c i a l computat ions from census samples . 
a / E x c l u d i n g t h e r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r y "misce l l aneous" . 
T a b l e 2 
G a u n t r i e s i n which 
t r a n s i t i o n was e a r l y 
A r g e n t i n a 
C o u n t r i e s i n which 
t r a n s i t i o n h a s been 
r e c e n t and r a p i d 
Panama 
B r a z i l 
E c u a d o r 
C o u n t r i e s i n which 
t r a n s i t i o n i s 
i n c i p i e n t 
H o n d u r a s 
B o l i v i a 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTK 1 H!=v) : 
OCCUPATIONAL TRANSITION 
P e r i o d , when EAP Annual g r o w t h , r a t e 
c e a s e d t o b e of p o p u l a t i o n 
p r e d o m i n a n t l y 
a g r i c u l t u r a l 1960-1965 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 5 
N i n e t e e n t h 
c e n t u r y 1.6 
1950-1960 3 .0 
1960-1970 3 .0 
1960-1970 3.2 
1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 0 3 . 5 
1970-1980 2 . 3 
1 . 6 
2 . 2 
2 . 3 
2 . 9 
3 . 4 
2 . 7 
THE DUAL DEMOGRAPHIC 1 
TO MODERNITY 
Per iod when EAP 
reached i t s r a t e 






Fu tu re 
Fu tu re 
S o u r c e : ECIAC, S t a t i s t i c a l Yea rbook f o r L a t i n America a n d t h e Car ibbean, 1985. 
N^D 
Maximum r a t e 
of growth of 
EAP 
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LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES) : ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE YOUNG ADULTS 
WITH POST-PRIMARY EDUCATION BY SOCIAL GROUP 
E c o n o m i c a l l y a c t i v e 
p o p u l a t i o n (24-34) 
Argentina a/ 
1960 1980 
Brazi l b / 
1960 1980 
Ecuador c / Honduras c / 
1962 1982 1961 1983 
Panama c / 
1960 1980 
1 . Non-manual d / 
P e r c e n t a g e o f EAP b e t w e e n 
25 and 34 y e a r s o f a g e 
P e r c e n t a g e w i t h 7 and 
+ y e a r s o f s t u d y 
2 . S e c t o r o f f o r m a l w o r k e r s e/ 
P e r c e n t a g e w i t h 7 a n d 
+ y e a r s o f s t u d y 
3 . I n f o r m a l u r b a n s e c t o r f/ 
P e r c e n t a g e w i t h 7 a n d 
+ y e a r s of s t u d y 
4 . P e a s a n t s g / 
P e r c e n t a g e w i t h 7 a n d 
+- y e a r s of s t u d y 
5 . A g r i c u l t u r a l w a g e - e a r n e r s 
P e r c e n t a g e w i t h 7 a n d 
+ y e a r s of s t u d y 
39.8 45.9 18.8 32.4 17.3 36 .1 13.5 30.4 26.8 42.4 
47.4 89 .6 5 9 . 1 79.9 50.0 82.4 72.2 79.5 79.5 88.7 
9 .6 20.8 13.0 26.3 13.7 35.0 5 .1 7.6 41.6 47.8 
14.0 27.4 13 .1 23.8 11 .1 33.2 4.4 ,0 44.6 47.5 
3.2 12 .1 2 . 1 4.0 1.7 3.6 0.2 0.6 0.7 6.7 
2 .0 5.0 1.3 3 .1 1.5 7.6 1.5 1.5 3.2 11.6 
S o u r c e : ECLAC, on t h e b a s i s o f s p e c i a l computat ions drawn from census samples. 
a / E i g h t y e a r s o f s t u d y o r m o r e . 
b / F i v e y e a r s o f s t u d y o r m o r e . 
c / 25 -29 y e a r s o f a g e . 
d / E m p l o y e r s , m a n a g e r s , p r o f e s s i o n a l s , o f f i c e workers and s a l e s p e r s o n n e l . 
e / Wage—earning a r t i s a n s , w o r k e r s , farm workers and workers p r o v i d i n g p e r s o n a l s e r v i c e s . 
f/ U n s a l a r i e d o w n - a c c o u n t a n d f a m i l y a r t i s a n s , workers , farm workers , workers p rov id ing pe r sona l s e r v i c e s and 
s t r e e t v e n d o r s , 
g / U n s a l a r i e d o w n - a c c o u n t a n d f a m i l y fa rmers . 
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE AÜOUND I960, 1970 AND 1975 
„, f - t 1 Income pe r h o u s e h o l d a / Increase in income per Tocal increase by Increase in each 
( in d o l l a r s a t 1970 household scracum (mil l ions scracuo as a per-
p r i c e s ) of do l la rs ac cencage of iacome 
Income s t r a t a
 p l n d o l l a r s a c 1970 p r i c e s ) c o c a l i n c r e a s e P e r c e n c a g e 1970 p r i c e s 
1 9 7 0 1 9 7 5 1 9 6 0 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 5 
a / C o r r e s p o n d s Co cr.e e s C i o i a c e c i a v a i l a b l e i a c o m e p e r h o u s e h o l d b a s e d o n c h e n a c i o n a l a c c o u n t s o f e a c h c o u n c r y . 
i 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 0 - i 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 5 0 - ¿ 9 7 0 -
1 9 7 0 1 9 7 5 1970 1975 1970 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 0 , y ~ 5 
P o o r e s t 20% 2 . 8 2 . 1 2 . 3 3 3 4 2 9 4 3 9 U - 1 2 . 0 3 4 . 0 -U0 100 4 9 4 . 1 1 4 0 9 . 9 1.Ü 
N e x t 2 0 Ï S . 3 5 . 0 5 . 4 7 0 7 7 1 5 9 0 2 1 . 1 2 5 . 2 8 137 1 8 7 1 . 2 2 8 5 5 . 1 3 . 7 
P o o r e s t 4.0S 8 . 7 7 . 1 7 . 7 5 2 0 5 0 5 6 4 S - 2 . 9 2 8 . 3 - 1 5 143 2 3 6 5 . 3 4 2 6 5 . 0 - . 7 
30% a b o v e Che p o o r e s t 40Z 1 3 . 6 1 7 . 1 1 8 . 1 1 « 8 3 1 6 6 0 2 0 2 3 1 1 . 9 2 1 . 9 177 363 8 0 3 0 . 4 3 8 4 0 . 1 1 5 . 7 
2 0 2 b e Low Che r i c h e s c 10Z 2 6 . 1 2 7 . 5 2 6 . 9 3 1 1 0 3 9 2 2 4 4 9 7 2 6 . 1 1 4 . 7 812 575 15 1 4 3 . 5 11 0 2 6 . 5 2 9 . 7 
R i c h e s t 1 'JX J 6 . 6 4 8 . 0 4 7 . 3 1 1 1 4 2 13 6 7 7 1 5 8 2 9 2 2 . 8 1 5 . 7 2 535 2 152 25 " 7 6 , 7 . 9 9 8 1 . 0 - 9 . 9 
~ o t a _ 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 2 3 8 9 2 S 5 2 3 3 4 3 1 9 . - 1 7 . 4 4 6 3 4 9 6 S3 0 1 5 . 9 ^4 ^ . 1 2 . " 1 0 ' . . ; 
\CLAC e s c i ~ a c e . ' b a s e d o n n a c i o n a l s u r v e y s f o r s e v e n c o u n t r i e s ( A r g e n t i n a , B r a z i l , C h i L e , C o l c c i b i a , M e x i c P e r u a n d V e n e z u e 
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Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE OF POVERTY 
Percentage of poverty 
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Source: ECLAC, "La pobreza en América Latina: discusiones y políticas", 
Estudios e Informes de la CEPAL Series, No. 54, Santiago, Chile, 1985, 
table 8, p. 46. 
CELADE. Boletín Demográfico, year XIV, No. 28, Santiago, Chile, July 
1981. 
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3 0 . 0 
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5 0 . N 
3 2 . 5 
1 .0 
0 . I 
50.2 
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2 8 . 5 
5 1 . 6 
2 3 . 9 
4 ) . 6 
1 0 . 7 
1 6 , 5 
1 5 . 3 
2 2 . 3 
3 9 . 2 
6 8 . 1 
3 9 . 2 
6 0 . 9 
77 5 
12.U 
2 6 . 2 
1 5 . 8 
3 7 . 6 
1 0 . 9 
3 3 . 0 
1 8 . 7 
6 0 . 1 
31.3 




l . G 
0 . 6 
1(8.3 
3 r-. 4 
4 0 . 3 
'11 .0 
C o s t a R i c a 1950 
1980 
2 9 . 7 1 2 . 3 
1 5 . 3 
4 2 . 0 
6 9 . 5 
3 7 . 3 
Î 0 . 5 
2 0 . ' i 
9 . 8 




Mexico 1 9 5 0 
1980 
2 1 . 6 
3 9 . 5 
1 2 . 9 
2 2 . 0 
3 9 . 5 
6 1 . 5 
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1 9 . 2 
4M.0 
IP. '1 
6 4 . li 
3 7 . 6 
1 . 1 
0 . 9 
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1 1 . 8 
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7 9 . 1 
1 6 . 4 
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5 1 . 1 
7 9 . u 
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5 0 . 9 
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1 2 . 6 
4 j . l 
3 5 . 9 
4 6 .0 
.19.1 
6 6 . 2 





3 J . 9 
31 . 1 
57.9 
57.7 
B o l i v i a 
1 9 5 0 
1980 
9 . 1 
1 7 . 9 
1 5 . 0 
2 3 . 7 
2 4 . 1 
4 1 . 1 
.19.0 
5 . 2 
5 3 . 7 
5 0 . 9 
7 2 . 7 
5 F . ) 
3 . 2 
2.f l 
Oil. 7 
7 1 . 1 
E c u a d o r 
1950 
1980 
2 1 . 5 
2 ^ . 6 
1 1 . 7 
2 0 . 6 
33.2 
5 4 . ; 
27 .4 
12. 1 
3 9 . 0 
33.M 
66 .4 0 .4 5 0 . 7 
6 7 . 0 
E l 
S a l v a d o r 
G u a t e -
m a l a 
P e r ' j 
1 9 5 0 
1980 
1 9 5 0 
19H0 
{ 1 9 5 0 1900 
28. 
1 6 . 5 
23.fi 
19.1 
3 7 . 7 
1 3 . 7 
1 8 . 9 
1 5 . 9 
19.8 
3 2 . 2 
4 7 . 5 
30.1-
4 ? . 7 
3 0 . 0 
^7 5 
3 2 . 5 
2 7 . 3 
2 0 . 6 
1 7 . 4 
33.9 
8.9 
3 5 . 0 
3 0 . 1 
3 9 . 4 
ai.n 
67 . 
6 9 . 3 
G1.3 
4 0 . 7 
0 .3 
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4 9 . 0 
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5 6 , 3 
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7 0 . 6 
8 2 . 9 
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7 1 . 7 
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1 9 . 0 
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5 . 5 8 . 0 
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0 .2 
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Table 7 
LATIN AMERICA. MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS" 
Indicators 1980 1981 1982 1983 198-1 1985 1986 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (index base year 1980 = 100) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(index base year 1980 = 100) 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Consumer prices' 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
Current value of exports of goods 
Current value of imports of goods 
Exports of goods 
Imports of goods 
Trade balance (goods) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Net movement of capital' 
Global balance 


































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data 
"The figures for the gross domestic product and consumer prices refer to the group formed by the countries included in table 2, 
except Cuba (23 countries) and in table 4, respectively. The data on the external sector relate to the 19 countries mentioned in 
the table "Latin America: Balance of Payments Provisional estimates subject to revision. ' Variation from 
December to December. Includes net unrequited private transfer payments 'Includes long and short-term 
capital, official unrequited transfer payments and errors and omissions. Relates to the variation in international 
reserves (of reverse sign) plus counterpart items. *See notes to table "Latin America: Total disbursed external debt' 
included in the text. 
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Table 8 































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures for the gross domestic product. The population figures are taken from Clil.A 1)1: 
estimates published in Boletín Demapajicn Vid. XIX. No. 38, July 1986 
Provisional estimates subject to revision. Refers to total social product 
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Tab le 9 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : U R B A N U N E M P L O Y M E N T 


















































































































































































Source: ECLAC and PREALC, on rhe basis of official data. 
Preliminary figures. Federal Capital and Greater Buenos Aires. Average for April and October; 1986, 
June. 'Who le country. Metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, 
Salvador and Recife: average for 12 months; 1980, averageJune-December; 1986 average January-October 'Bogotá, 
Barranquilla, Medellín and Cali: average for March, June, September and December; 1986 average for April, June and 
September. National urban. Average for March, July and November; 1984, average March and November; 1986 
average March and July. 'Grea ter Santiago. Average for four quarters As from August 198^ data relate to the 
Metropolitan Region of Santiago. Whole country. Officiai estimates, 'Metropolitan areas of Mexico City, 
Guadalajara and Monterrey, average for twelve months . 1986: average January-August. ' National 
average. National urban, Augusr of each year 1980 corresponds roune/nploymenr in urban area registered by national 
census taken in February of that year; 1981 corresponds to metropolitan area. Non-agricultural 
activities. m Whole country, average for two half-years; 1978, average for July and December; 1980, average for August 
and December, and 1985. average for January j n d J u n e "Montevideo, average for two half-years. As from 1981, 
average for four quarters; 1986, average January-November "National urban, average for two semesters; 1986, firsi 
semester (official estimate). 
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Table 10 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER PRICES 

















































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official price indexes supplied by the countries, supplemented in some cases by figures 
published in International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistic', November 1986 
"Preliminary figures. The totals for Latin America correspond to the variations for the individual countries, weighted 
by the respective population in each year. 'Corresponds to variation between November 1985 and November 
1986. Corresponds to variation betwecnjuly 1985 and July 1986 'Corresponds to variation between Ociubci 
1985 and October 1986. 'Corresponds to variation between August 1985 and August 1986. 'Corresponds to 
variation between September 1985 and September 1986 Corresponds to variation between June 1985 and |unc 1986 
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T a b l e 1 I 


































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC. on the basis of official data. 
"Including debts with IMF Preliminary figures ' Total medium- and long-term debt Public debt, plus 
non-guaranteed long- and short-term debt with financial institutions reporting to the Bank for International 
Settlements. 'Total medium- and long-term, debt, plus short-term debt according to World Bank data. As from 19H<i, 
corresponds to total debt according to official data. Public debt. M'iguresnt W.6 86 Rate corresponds to period 
30.6.85/30 6 86 
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Table 12 
LATIN AMERICA: RATIO OF TOTAL INTEREST PAYMENTS TO 
































































































































































































































Source: 1978-1986. ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Interest payments include those on the short-term debt Preliminary estimates subject to revision 
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Table 13 
LATIN AMERICA: NET INFLOW OF CAPITAL A N D T R A N S F E R S O F RESOURCES 













































































































Source: 197V 1985: ECLAC. on the basis of data supplied by the IMF F.CI.AC. on the basis 
Percentages. Preliminary estimates subject to revision 
pf official figures 
T a b l e 14 
LATIN AMERICA: EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS, 1980-1985 a/ 
E c o n o m i c a l l y a c t i v e p o p u l a t i o n 
T o t a l p o p u l a t i o n i n employment 
T o t a l , n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l p o p u l a t i o n 
i n employment 
Unemployment 
I n f o r m a l urban s e c t o r 
F o r m a l u rban s e c t o r 
a) Public sector 
b) Private sector 
i ) Large f i r m s b / 
i i ) Small f i r m s 
Employment i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
i n d u s t r y 
E s ^ l o y m e n t - i r i d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t 





















































































- 2 . 2 
5.5 





S o u r c e : PREALC, on t h e b a s i s o f h o u s e h o l d s u r v e y s i n e a c h c o u n t r y . 
a / W e i g h t e d a v e r a g e b a s e d on 9 c o u n t r i e s . I n c l u d i n g A r g e n t i n a , B r a z i l , C h i l e , Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
M e x i c o , Peru and V e n e z u e l a , 
by F i r m s w i t h more t h a n 10 employees . Weighted a v e r a g e i n B r a z i l , Mexico and Venezuela. 
Q/ T h e method of c a l c u l a t i o n and t h e p e r i o d s a r e d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e i n t a b l e 4. 
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Table 15 
IATTN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF REAL WAGES, 1980-1985 3/ 
Wages in manufacturing industry 
Minimum urban wages 
Wages in construction 




















Source: PREALC, on the basis of information from each country. 
a/ Variations between extreme years in the simple averages of 12 countries for 
industrial wages, 18 for minimum wages, 14 for wages in construction, 9 for 
wages in the public sector and 16 for agricultarai wages. 
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Table 16 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION a/ 
Percent i le of 1 
households according 
to per cap i ta income , 
1 - 10 
11 - 20 
21 - 30 
31 - 40 
«1 - 50 
51 - 60 
61 - 70 
71 - B0 
81 - 90 
91 - 100 
Cocf. of concentration: 
- Gini 
• Logarithmic variance 
Average family 
income ç/ 
Incidence of poverty 
(percentage of 
households) 
Types of income 







































































































Primary cash income 














! 16 469 
17.3 
S a l a r i e ; 
June 
Costa Rica 

































i n cash 
June 
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Table 16 (conclusion) 
; P e r c e n t ) l e o 
i househo lds a c c o r d i n g | 






















| Coef . o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n : 
| • G in i 
| - L o g a r i t h m i c v a r i a n c e 
| Average f a m i l y 
| income £ / 
] I n c i d e n c e o f 
Ü (pe r cen tage 
\ househo lds ) 
p o v e r t y 
of 
I Types o f income 
|| Reference pe r i o d s 
C h i l e 







































































































i n cash 
August 







































































































fl/ Percentage participation in to ta l income. 
b/ Households with wage-earning heads. 
ç/ Monthly Income in national currency, at the last studied year's pr ice. In the case of B raz i l , income is 
given in thousands of cruzeiros. 
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Table 17 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF THE ACTIVE POPULATION AND 
OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT 





agriculture 1.01 0.41 0.36 2.0 a/ 4.1a/ 
2. Agricultural 
product 3.5 3.5 3.6 1.86 3.76 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 




LATIN AMERICA: RATIO OF CALORIES AVAILABLE PER INHABITANT TO CALORY 



















































































































IATTN AMERICA: PER CAPITA PUB1IC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION 
(Ficaires in dollars at constant 1980 prices) 



















Venezuela 184 205 256 
Latin America 65 84 73 78 
Source: For public expenditure as a percentage of GNP: UNESCO, Statistical 
Yearbook, 1985. 
For GNP in dollars at 1980 prices: ECIAC, on the basis of official 
data. 


































































LATIN AMERICA: PROJECTIONS OF SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION 
(BOTH SEXES) BY AGE, 1950-2000 
Both sexes 
Tota l 
0 - 4 
























25 and over 
Source: CELADE, 
1980 
550 907 115 
50 556 543 
45 855 691 
9 509 183 
9 335 085 
9 166 184 
9 002 257 
8 84} 001 
lil 974 244 
8 683 762 
8 519 605 
8 373 238 
8 252 749 
8 144 690 
38 559 473 
8 052 042 
7 924 592 
7 771 895 
7 549 158 
7 281 785 
32 665 015 
7 018 4i»6 
6 747 560 
6 498 742 
6 291 051 
6 109 215 
141 496 149 
Bolet ín Demográfico, 
1985 
392 863 479 
54 396 743 
49 250 859 
10 196 450 
10 Oil 215 
9 839 303 
9 678 260 
9 525 650 
45 463 853 
9 582 256 
9 248 850 
9 106 926 
8 947 653 
8 778 169 
4l 513 0?4 
8 610 484 
8 437 263 
8 280 499 
8 150 753 
B 034 089 
37 883 881 
7 911 210 
7 792 057 
7 631 484 
7 407 022 
7 142 n o 
164 }55 089 
Vol. XIX, No. 38, 
1990 
457 580 700 
57 675 941 
55 380 151 
11 037 550 
10 858 803 
10 677 495 
10 494 724 
10 511 795 
48 901 297 
10 127 247 
9 939 605 
9 764 069 
9 607 502 
9 462 878 
45 057 695 
9 517 542 
9 175 489 
9 024 567 
8 857 927 
8 682 176 
40 951 708 
B 506 525 
8 524 047 
8 160 609 
B 028 571 
7 912 156 
191 653 908 
July 1986, p . 18. 
1995 
485 509 807 
59 659 202 
56 754 229 
11 607 802 
11 485 586 
11 557 148 
11 222 404 
11 081 288 
53 061 882 
10 935 982 
10 788 647 
10 628 003 
10 449 492 
10 259 766 
48 537 997 
10 068 974 
9 873 789 
9 690 390 
9 527 452 
9 577 596 
44 540 420 
9 225 028 
9 074 665 
8 917 798 
8 749 083 
6 573 847 
220 956 077 
?000 






































48 045 541 












LATIN AMERICA AND A NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVE COUNTRIES: 
GROSS PER CAPITA DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Dollars at 1970 prices) 








Ol L J L 
1950 1960 1970 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 




LATIN AMERICA: RATES OF GROWTH OF THE UNDER -25 AND TOTAL 
























] Total population 
5 10 15 20 
Growth rate per thousand 
25 30 35 
Source: CELADE, Boletín Demográfico. Year XIX, Na 38 (July 1986). 
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Figure 4 
THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT 
IN BASIC GOODS AND SOCIAL SERVICES 
(Index of employment created per unit of investment. 




2 000 _ 
1 500 
1 000 — 
500 _ 
Housing Education Health Roads Irrigation Water and Electricity 
drainage 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data drawn from PREALC, El efecto empleo de la inversión pública, 
Investigaciones sobre empleo Series, Na 23i Santiago, Chile, 1984. 
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